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Abstract
In modern multi-user computer and network systems, access control is an important
aspect of the overall security of a given system. The problem is that as the number of
users and systems that are being controlled increases, it can quickly become difficult
to keep track of exactly who has access to what. Another problem is that with todays
heterogeneous systems, systems of the same type but from different vendors often
have different methods for configuring access control.
Many systems like SNMP entities, HTTP servers, LDAP, XML based informa-
tion etc. have one thing in common, they all store their information in a tree based
structure. Based on this fact this thesis describe two graphical modeling languages
that can be used for specifying the access control setup in most systems that store
information in a tree based structure.
The Tree-based Access control Modeling Language (TACOMA) is the simplest
language that is defined. It is easy to learn and use as it has only 7 symbols and two
relations. With this language it is possible to define the exact access control rules for
users using a graphical notation. The simplicity of the language do however come at
a cost: it is best suited for small or medium sized tasks where the number of users
and objects being controlled are limited.
To solve the scalability problem a second language is also presented. The Pol-
icy Tree-based Access control Modeling Language (PTACOMA) is a policy based
version of TACOMA that doubles the number of symbols and relations. While it is
harder to learn it scales better to larger tasks. It also allows for distributed specifica-
tion of access rules where administrators of different domains can be responsible for
specifying their own access control rules. Domains can be organized in a hierarchical
manner so that administrators on a higher level can create policies that have higher
priority and therefor limits what administrators at lower levels can do.
The thesis describes the two languages in detail and provides a comparison be-
tween them to show the strong and weak points of each language. There is also a
detailed case study that shows how the two languages can be used for specifying
access control in SNMPv3.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter describes the background and motivation behind the thesis and provides
an overview of how the rest of the thesis is organized.
1.1 Background and motivation
“A picture is worth a thousand words”. This is a maxim well known to most people,
although it is often mistakenly quoted as being a Chinese proverb belonging to Con-
fucius. Its origin is actually two articles published in the trade journal “Printer’s Ink”
in 1921 and 1927 by Frederick Barnard[1, 2]. The first article was titled “One Look
Is Worth a Thousand Words” and talked in general about the benefits of advertising
with pictures on street cars. In this article the proverb was attributed to a “famous
Japanese philosopher”. In 1927 he revised the saying to “One picture is worth ten
thousand words” and this time he claimed it was a “Chinese proverb”. By calling it
a Chinese proverb Frederick Bernard thought his words would be more believable.
Today the proverb is known all over the world and few question its validity. In
computer science and telecommunication pictures, diagrams and graphical notations
have been used for a long time to help programmers and system operators to under-
stand the complexities of modern computer and communication systems.
1.1.1 Diagrams
The most common visualization method used in computer science and telecommu-
nication is diagrams. They are used as a way to understand the complex architecture
of modern systems. A diagram is a method for conveying a message by means of
drawing lines. The Merriam-Webster dictionary[3] defines a diagram as:
“a graphic design that explains rather than represents; especially : a drawing
that shows arrangement and relations (as of parts)”.
The earliest forms of diagrams are maps. Maps are considered diagrams because
they relate physical distance between locations in the world and physical distance
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of these locations on paper. At the same time they abstract out details, for example
roads are represented by straight lines, coastlines are abbreviated etc.
It is this abstraction of details that make diagrams very useful for dealing with
complex computer and communication systems. In computer science and telecom-
munication there are many examples of highly successful graphical notations.
One well known notation is Entity-Relationship diagrams. These diagrams are
used for high level modeling of complex database systems and help designers create
accurate and useful conceptual models. The E-R diagram was created by Professor
Peter Chen[4] to serve as a tool for communication between designers and users.
Chen recognized that users and developers often have difficulties communicating
and that a visual diagrammatic notation could help bridge this gap. An E-R diagram
presents a visual overview of the data and relationships between data in a database
in a way that is relatively easy to understand even for normal users.
Another example of a diagrammatic language is the Specification and Description
Language (SDL)[5]. The development of this language started in 1972 and it was
designed as a language for specifying and designing telecommunication systems.
Today the language can be used to develop any real time concurrent system. The
purpose of SDL is to help developers understand and model the complex behavior of
real time concurrent systems and protocols.
For development of large and complex object oriented software systems, the Uni-
fied Modeling Language (UML)[6] is commonly used. UML is a collection of sev-
eral diagram types that makes it possible for developers to model both the static and
dynamic properties of large and complex software projects.
These are just a few examples of the many graphical notations that successfully
have made complex matters easier to handle.
1.1.2 MIB View Modeling Language
Based on the fact that visual representation using diagrams helps people to better
understand complex systems, the work described in this thesis started out as research
into finding an easy method for specifying access control configurations in the Simple
Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
SNMP was released as a draft standard in 1988 and became a full standard in
1990[7, 8, 9]. Since its release, SNMP has been the most commonly used protocol
for monitoring network equipment in TCP/IP networks like the Internet and big in-
tranets. Today, not only network devices like routers and switches support SNMP,
but also most other devices that are connected to a network like printers and servers
have built in support for it.
One weakness with the first and second version of SNMP is that they both share
a very weak security model where the only authentication is a password sent in clear
text over the network. This lack of security is one of the reasons why SNMP is most
commonly used for monitoring and only rarely used for configuring devices.
When the work on this thesis started, the draft version of SNMPv3[10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17, 18] had just been released. SNMPv3 supports proper security mech-
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anisms like strong authentication and access control. Many organizations and com-
panies had complained about the weak security in SNMP and at that time many ex-
pected that SNMPv3 would increase the usage of SNMP for configuration as it could
now be done in a secure way. In one of the first published books about SNMPv3[19]
the author wrote in the preface:
“I have this image in my mind of SNMPv3 as a series of dark clouds that are
rolling in over the horizon. Like it or not the storm is coming and you’d better be
prepared for it”
So far this storm has not come, one reason being that operators do not want yet
another system of user authentication to keep track of. The IETF has now started
a working group called Integrated Security Model for SNMP (ISMS)[20], which
works on extending SNMPv3 so that it can use external authentication systems like
TACACS1 or RADIUS2.
The access control mechanism defined in SNMPv3 is the View-based Access
Control Model (VACM). One of the goals when developing this model was that it
should add as little overhead as possible when processing SNMP packets and an
implementation should have a small footprint. The reason for these design goals was
that SNMP is often implemented on network equipment with limited resources. One
cost of the low overhead and small implementation footprint of VACM, is that it does
not scale well for a large number of different users and fine grained access control.
The access control mechanisms in VACM are controlled through a MIB called
the VACM MIB. The VACM MIB contains four tables that together decides if a user
is allowed access to a managed object or not and what type of access he is granted.
When these tables grow large, it can quickly become difficult to keep track of exactly
who have access to what.
There are commercial tools available that implements a graphical interface to the
VACM tables. This is however not enough since the managers controlling the access
rights still have to manipulate the tables directly without any abstractions. This was
the motivation behind this thesis. It started out as a work on defining a graphical
modeling language that could be used for configuring the access control and security
parameters in SNMPv3.
This research first resulted in the MIB View Modeling Language (MVML)[21].
MVML is a simple graphical notation with few symbols and relations specially de-
signed for specifying MIB views for VACM. This language was found to be very
easy to learn and use for small and medium sized networks.
To handle large networks with a high number of users and managed objects, the
Policy-based MIB View Modeling Language (PMVML) was created. PMVML uses
a policy based paradigm for specifying access control. The cost for being able to
scale to large networks is an increase in complexity. PMVML doubled the number
of available symbols and relations.
1Terminal Access Controller Access Control System
2Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
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1.1.3 A diagrammatic notation for modeling tree-based access
control
As the work on implementing a prototype for MVML and PMVML progressed, it
became apparent that the methods used could easily be made more generic and be
applied to almost any application that store information in a tree-based structure.
Some examples are SNMP, LDAP or even web pages on a HTTP server that stores
the files in a tree-based file system.
The work presented in this thesis is therefore two general purpose graphical mod-
eling languages for specifying access control for applications and systems that stores
information in a tree based structure. The two languages presented are:
Tree-based Access control Modeling Language (TACOMA) a simple notation with
few symbols and relations. It was developed with ease of use as the pri-
mary goal. It is however best suited for small and medium sized tasks
with a limited number of users and objects.
Policy Tree-based Access control Modeling Language (PTACOMA)[22] a more
advanced notation which builds on TACOMA and doubles the number
of symbols and relations. It can be used for large tasks with a high num-
ber of users and objects at the cost of being more difficult to learn and
use. It is based on policies and together with a proper editor it allows for
distributed specification of access control that can span multiple admin-
istrative domains.
Configuring access control in applications and systems can often be challenging.
First of all each type of application or system usually have very different methods for
doing the configuration and each method must be learned properly so that access to
protected resources are not granted by mistake. Even systems of the same type but
from different vendors can often have different methods for configuring the access
control.
Instead of having to learn and master all these different methods for configur-
ing access control, the graphical modeling languages described in this thesis can be
used. Depending on the number of users and resources being controlled, administra-
tors only have to learn one or two graphical modeling languages for configuring all
applications and devices that stores information in tree based structures.
1.2 Outline of the thesis
The thesis consists of 8 chapters where the main work is described in chapter 4
through 7.
Chapter 2 gives a short introduction to various access control models.
Chapter 3 introduces the mathematical properties of trees and discusses access
control in tree based structures.
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Chapter 4 presents the Tree-based Access Control Modeling Language. The syn-
tax of the modeling language is described in detail and all symbols defined in the
language are described. This chapter also describes an XML format that can be used
for storing TACOMA diagrams and which also act as a formal definition of the struc-
ture of the language.
Chapter 5 describes the policy based version of TACOMA called PTACOMA.
It starts by giving a short introduction to domains and policies and then follows the
same outline as chapter 4 where it provides a detailed description of all available
symbols. An XML format is also described and some simple examples on how the
language can be used are given.
Chapter 6 compares the two languages defined in the thesis and discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of each language. The chapter also provides a rationale for
why both languages are useful.
Chapter 7 is a case study which shows how PTACOMA can be applied for spec-
ifying access control in SNMPv3 for a real world use case.
Chapter 8 summarizes the work presented in the thesis, provides some conclu-
sions and discusses further work.
Appendix B is an overview of SNMP with focus on the security mechanisms of
SNMPv3.
Appendix C describes a prototype implementation of TACOMA and PTACOMA
for configuring access control in SNMP entities.
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Chapter 2
Access Control
This chapter provides a short introduction to access control and gives an overview of
various existing access control models.
2.1 Introduction
The task of access control in a system is to limit what authenticated users are allowed
to access in the system. Figure 2.1 shows a high level abstraction of how access
control works. A user, usually called subject, who wants to access a resource, usually
called object, in the system is first authenticated by the authentication system. The
task of the authentication system is to verify the identity of subjects trying to access
the system. Subjects do not have to be real users, but can also be applications running
on behalf of a user.
If the subject is properly identified, then the request is passed on to the access
control system. The access control system checks with an authorization database to
see if the user is allowed to access the object. There can be different types of access,
like read, write, create etc., and each subject can have limited or no access to objects
based on the type of access. To control which subject has access to which objects, a
security administrator can update the authorization database.
Figure 2.1: Access control
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The authorization database is rarely implemented as a centralized database, but
instead it is often distributed where for example each object has a list of attributes
deciding who can access it. It is also important to realize that in many systems,
subjects can themselves be objects and be controlled by the access control system.
Research into access control models has been going on for many years. The
U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) was among the first to formalize access control
models. This work was part of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
(TCSEC)[23]. In this document two different access control models are defined:
Discretionary Access Control(DAC) and Mandatory Access Control (MAC).
It has later been shown that these two models do not always fulfill the needs of
organizations outside the DoD and a lot of research have gone into defining a new
access control model called Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)[24, 25, 26, 27, 28].
In 2004 RBAC was standardized by the InterNational Committee for Information
Technology Standards (INCITS).
2.2 Mandatory Access Control
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) was first specified by TCSEC and is heavily based
on military requirements. MAC is a model that limits access to objects based on
the sensitivity of the information contained in the object. The level of sensitivity
is represented by a label. The sensitivity levels are hierarchical in nature and can
typically be top secret, secret, confidential or unclassified. Subjects are assigned
a security clearance and access to objects are granted or denied depending on the
relation between clearance of the subject and the security label of the object.
2.2.1 Lattice Model
A formal model of the MAC model using lattices was developed by Denning[29].
In this model there is a set of subjects S , objects O and security levels L . All
subjects and objects are then assigned a specific security level. To decide if a subject
s ∈ S can access an object o ∈ O the model looks at the relationship between the
security level, clearance, of the subject and the security level, classification, of the
object. Access is permitted if the clearance dominates the classification, otherwise it
is denied.
The work by Denning defines a relation ≥ which can be used to compare two
security levels to decide if access is granted or denied. Assume that objects can
have different sensitivity levels like top secret (TS), secret (S), confidential (C) or
unclassified (U) which has a natural ordering so that T S > S >C >U . The collection
of object sensitivity is then R = {T S,S,C,U}. For any user that needs to access
objects there will be a collection of necessary objects called compartments. Let this
collection of compartments be T . We then have L = R×T and a security level
l ∈ L is a pair (lR , lT ) where lR ∈ R and lT ∈ T . The relation ≥ can then be
defined as:
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o1 o2 o3 o4
s1 read,write read read read, write
s2 read read
s3 execute read read, execute
Table 2.1: Access matrix
(l ≥ l′)⇔ (lR ≥ l′R) and (lT ⊇ l′T ) for l, l′ ∈L .
With this relation a subject s ∈ S with clearance ls ∈ L is given access to an
object O with classification lo ∈L if and only if ls ≥ lo.
2.3 Discretionary Access Control
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is the second access control model that was
specified in TCSEC. In DAC the owner of an object controls the access control per-
missions of it and it is up to the owner’s discretion to assign access permission to
objects. DAC is a model often found in commercial systems, one example being
UNIX file systems.
2.3.1 Access Matrix Model
Most systems that supports DAC uses an access matrix model which was first intro-
duced by Lampson[30]. This model uses a matrix where the rows are indexed by the
subjects S and the columns by the objects O . All access permissions held by a user
s ∈S over an object o ∈O is specified in the matrix entry (s,o). Table 2.1 shows an
example of an access matrix.
In this table we can for example see that the entry (s2,o4) gives user s2 read
access to object o4. In real world systems the access matrix will contain a lot of
empty entries and can be very large. For this reason DAC is rarely implemented as
a real matrix. The table is usually stored either by column or by row. Storing by
columns means that each object has an Access Control List(ACL) associated with it
and this list contains the access rights of each subject that are allowed access to the
object. For example object o2 would have an ACL like this: (s1,read),(s4,read).
Storing by row means that each subject has a list of capabilities that shows which
objects the subject can access and the type of access that is allowed. Subject s3 has
the following capabilities: (o1,execute),(o2,read),(o4,read execute).
2.4 Role Based Access Control
While many commercial systems have implemented DAC, many systems have also
implemented some sort of role based access control for many years[31]. The basic
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principal behind Role-Based Access Control(RBAC)[32] is that instead of giving ac-
cess rights directly to subjects, they are given to roles and then subjects are assigned
one or more roles to allow accessing objects.
RBAC is an advanced concept and requirements varies a lot among different sys-
tems. Because of this the RBAC standard is divided into four parts where only one
of them is mandatory to support. The rest are optional and can be added if needed.
The four parts are:
Core RBAC the essential aspects of RBAC that all systems must support.
Hierarchical RBAC adds support for hierarchical roles.
SSD Static Separation of Duty relations.
DSD Dynamic Separation of Duty relations.
2.4.1 Core RBAC
The Core RBAC model specifies element sets and relations that are mandatory for
all systems that supports RBAC. The five basic data elements are:
USERS a set of users that are allowed access to the system
ROLES a set of roles that can be assigned to users
OBS a set of objects that can be accessed by roles
OPS a set of operations that can be performed on objects
PRMS a set of permissions that allows specific operations to be applied to spe-
cific objects
In addition to these five basic data elements, there is also a set called SESSIONS.
A session is a mapping between a user and one or more roles that are assigned to
the user. This means that a user can have different roles depending on the current
session.
One important aspect of RBAC is that permissions to access objects are always
given to roles and never directly to a user. If one single user needs more access, a
new role should be created and given access and the user should be assigned this new
role. A use can have multiple roles.
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Figure 2.2: Role hierarchy
2.4.2 Hierarchical RBAC
Hierarchical RBAC makes it possible to create a hierarchy of roles where one role
can inherit access rules from other roles. Figure 2.2 shows an example of this. In this
figure we can see that role R1inherits R0 and role R3 inherits both R1 and R2. The
fact that a role rx inherits role ry means that all privileges of ry is also privileges of
rx[33].
While hierarchical RBAC is optional, it is a feature that is commonly used by
products offering role based access control.
2.4.3 Statics Separation of Duty relations
Separation of duty is an important feature in many systems. The idea is that for
critical tasks it should not be possible for one single person to have access to do
everything and that the task has to be separated between two or more people.
With static separation of duty (SSD) there are rules that dictates which roles a
user might be assigned. As an example a rule might dictate that a user that has been
assigned role r0 can not also be assigned role r1.
2.4.4 Dynamic Separation of Duty relations
With dynamic separation of duty (DSD) the rules dictating which roles a user can
have, can be dynamic and change according to which session the user uses. For
example if a user is assigned role r0, a DSD rule can say that the user can only take
on role r1if he deactivates role r0.
2.5 Extensible Access Control Markup Language
The Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)[34, 35] is an XML
based language standardized by Organization for the Advancement of Structured
Information Standards (OASIS) for specifying access control requirements. It is a
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Figure 2.3: XACML core framework
general purpose language designed for supporting the needs of most authorization
systems.
The standard documents describing XACML defines both the syntax for the pol-
icy language as well as a request and response format for querying policy systems.
The core framework for XACML is shown in figure 2.3.
This figure shows the 6 usual steps in XACML for deciding if an action is per-
mitted or not:
1. Access request: the access requester, for example an application, sends an
access request to the policy enforcement point.
2. XACML request: the policy enforcement point (PEP) sends an XACML re-
quest message to the policy decision point (PDP). The format of this message
is specified by XACML.
3. Fetch policy: the PDP will look at the XACML Request, identify the targeted
resources of the request and fetch all policies that governs these resources.
4. Fetch optional attributes: a policy specified in XACML can include attributes
and conditions that these attributes have to fulfill for the policy to be valid. This
can for example be used for creating a policy saying that a user only has access
as long as the load on the system is low.
5. XACML response: response back to the PEP can be: permit, deny, not appli-
cable or indeterminate.
6. Access resource: if PEP receives back a permit response, access to the re-
source is carried out.
Chapter 3
Tree structures
This chapter provides an overview of the mathematical properties of trees. To be able
to understand these properties better, the chapter starts by giving a general overview
of graphs. The chapter ends by describing access control mechanisms in tree-based
structures.
3.1 Tree structure fundamentals
Storing information in a tree structure is a method much used in computer science.
Trees are a special form of graphs so to understand the mathematical properties of
trees, one must first understand the basics of graphs.
3.1.1 Graphs
There are two main types of graphs, directed and undirected. Figure 3.1 shows an
example of these two types of graphs where graph (a) is directed and (b) is undi-
rected. This figure is used to define the various aspects and terminology for graphs.
The overview of graphs in this section is not complete and only enough basic prop-
erties are given to be able to understand the description of trees given later in the
chapter.
1 2 3
(a)
1 2 3
(b)
Figure 3.1: Directed and undirected graphs
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The circles in figure 3.1 are called vertices and the lines between them are edges.
In a directional graph, the edges are drawn using an arrow while undirectional
graphs use a simple line. The common mathematical notation of a graph G is G =
(V,E) where V is a finite set of vertices and E is a binary relation on V specifying
edges.
With this notation the graph (a) in the figure can be written as:
G = ({1,2,3},{(1,2),(2,2),(3,2)}.
The only difference between a directed and an undirected graph, is that in an
undirected graph the edge set E consists of unordered pairs of vertices. A single
edge of a graph is a set {u,v} where u,v ∈ V . For undirected graphs u 6= v also
applies. The set {u,v} is commonly written using the notation (u,v).
A path in a graph G = (V,E) from a vertex u to a vertex u′ is a sequence of
vertices,< v0,v1, ....,vk >, where u = v0, u′ = vk and (vi−1,vi) ∈ E for i = 1,2, ...k.
The number of edges in the path is considered the length of the path. If all vertices
in a path are distinct, the path is called simple.
In a simple graph, the path < v0,v1, ...,vk > forms a cycle if v0 = vk and the path
contains at least one edge. An acyclic graph is a graph that contains no cycles.
An undirected graph is connected if every pair of vertices is connected by a path.
3.1.2 Trees
There are different types of trees. A free tree as shown in figure 3.2 is a connected,
acyclic, undirected graph. If an undirected graph is acyclic but disconnected, it is
a forest as shown in figure 3.3. If G = (V,E) is an undirected graph, the following
properties for a free tree is true[36]:
1. G is a free tree
2. Any two vertices in G are connected by a unique simple path.
3. G is connected, but if any edge is removed from E, the resulting graph is dis-
connected.
4. G is connected, and |E|= |V |−1
5. G is acyclic, and |E|= |V |−1
6. G is acyclic, but if any edge is added to E, the resulting graph contains a cycle.
Figure 3.4 shows a rooted tree. In a rooted tree one of the vertices is distin-
guished from the others and is called the root of the tree. A vertex in a rooted tree is
often referred to as a node. In figure 3.4 node 1 is the root of the tree.
In a rooted tree T with root r, any node y on the direct path from r to x is an
ancestor of x. If y is an ancestor of x, then x is a descendant of y. In figure 3.4 node
9 is a descendant of node 2 and node 4 is an ancestor of both node 7 and 8.
3.1. TREE STRUCTURE FUNDAMENTALS 15
Figure 3.2: Free tree
Figure 3.3: Forest
1
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7 8
depth 0
depth 1
depth 2
depth 3
Figure 3.4: Rooted tree
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By definition all nodes are both an ancestor and a descendant of itself. If x 6= y and
y is an ancestor of x, then y is a proper ancestor of x and x is a proper descendant
of y.
A subtree rooted at a node x is the tree rooted at x containing the descendants of
x. In figure 3.4 the subtree rooted at node 2 will include node 2, 5, 6 and 9.
On the path from root r of a tree T , to a node x, the last edge on the path is (y,x).
Here y is the parent of x and x is a child of y. When two or more nodes have the same
parent, they are siblings. The only node in T that does not have any parent is the root
node r. A node with no descendants is called a leaf.
The degree of a node x in a rooted tree T is the number of descendants that node
x have. The length of the path from the root r to a node x is called the depth of x in
T . In figure 3.4 node 6 have a depth of 2.
3.2 Access control in tree structures
Many applications that store information in tree based structures need access control
to be able to restrict access to certain nodes or subtrees in the main tree structure.
This thesis will use a notation for specifying access control where access rules are
used to either include or exclude nodes or subtrees from the main tree.
The collection of access rules, R, that specifies which nodes a user has access to
in a tree can be written as R = (T,A) where T = (V,E) is the tree and A is a set of
tuples of the type {N, I,S}, where N is a node N ∈ V , I ∈ {i,e} specifies if a node
is included or excluded and S ∈ {s,c,n} specifies if access is granted to the entire
subtree rooted at N, the children of N or just the node N.
With this notation it is always assumed that all descendants of a node N is in-
cluded when S ∈ {s,c}. If only proper descendants are wanted, then two rules will
have to be specified. One that includes all descendants and one that removes the
parent node so that only proper descendants are left.
Figure 3.5 shows a tree T where user U has access to node 2, 4, 5 and 6. This can
be written as RU = (T,A) where
T =({1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9},{(1,2),(1,3),(1,4),(2,5),(2,6),(5,9),(4,7),(4,8)})
and A = {(2, i,c),(4, i,n)}.
Given a function f (R) that returns all nodes that R provides access to, R′ =
(T ′,A′) is equal to R = (T,A) if and only if f (R′) = f (R). For figure 3.5 it is also
possible to write R′U = (T,A′) where A′ = {(2, i,s),(9,e,n),(4, i,n)}. In this example
R′ = R because f (R′) = f (R) = {2,4,5,6}
It is often advisable to optimize the number of entries in the set A. The set A′ is
an optimization of A if f (A) = f (A′) and |A′|< |A|. A′ is fully optimized if there do
not exist an A′′ where f (A′′) = f (A′) and |A′′|< |A′|.
For many uses of the modeling languages described in this thesis, the set T will
change dynamically and not be fully known when specifying access control. The re-
minder of the thesis will therefor mostly concentrate on the content of A when talking
about access rules for a specific user U . In addition to this, access control rules will
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Figure 3.5: Access control
be tied to specific entities. If talking about the access rules for a specific user U
on a specific entity E the notation UE = A will be used. The complete collection
of access rules for a user, U , is then the set containing the rules for all the entities,
U = {UE1,UE2, .....,UEn}.
Extended object identifiers
In the notation above the various nodes in the tree structures have been addressed by
its number. In real world situations, nodes in tree structures can have similar names
and will have to be addressed by a name that traverses the tree from the root node so
that each node can be uniquely identified. To accomplish this, this thesis introduces
the concept of extended object identifiers (EOIDs). EOIDs are a superset of normal
object identifiers (OIDs). Normal OIDs are an ASN.1 data type that can be used as
reference to data objects and are ordered lists of non-negative numbers. In Internet
RFCs[37, 38] OIDs are usually written using a character string where the numbers
are separated by a dot. For example the OID “1.2.5.9” points to node 9 in figure 3.5.
Extended OIDs introduced in this thesis are a superset of normal OIDs as they are
not limited to only simple non-negative numbers. An EOID is simply defined as a
string that uniquely identifies one or more nodes in a tree structure. The exact syntax
for an EOID will depend on the application or system that is being referenced.
For example in an SNMP environment an EOID that points to the system name
could be all of the following:
• .1.3.6.1.2.1.1.5.0
• .iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib-2.system.sysName.0
• SNMPv2-MIB::sysName.0
• sysName.0
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The last entry only defines a unique OID if there exists no other nodes with the name
SysName.
An EOID can also contain wild cards for pointing to multiple nodes. For example
the EOID “1.4.*” will point to both node 7 and 8 in figure 3.4.
In an XML environment an EOID could follow the XPATH syntax to represent
one or more nodes.
Chapter 4
Tree-based Access Control Modeling
Language
This chapter provides a detailed description of the Tree-based Access control Model-
ing Language (TACOMA). It starts by describing the main components needed to use
TACOMA for access control configuration, describes in detail the symbols and rela-
tions used in TACOMA and gives some examples on how the language can be used.
The chapter ends by giving an overview of an XML schema that helps to formaly
define the TACOMA language.
4.1 TACOMA overview
The Tree-based Access Control Modeling Language is a general purpose graphical
notation that can be used for specifying and configuring access control in systems
that store information in a tree based structure. Figure 4.1 shows the TACOMA
framework and the various components that are needed for using TACOMA to con-
figure the access control in a system. Two goals when designing TACOMA were to
make it simple to use and easy to implement support for new applications. So in this
figure only the four boxes with gray background have to be specifically designed for
the application that TACOMA is being used to specify access control rules for.
All other boxes are generic code or formats that are common for all use of
TACOMA. Of the four boxes that have to be implemented specifically for an ap-
plication, the “Tree generator” is only needed if the number of access control entries
is being optimized and the “Application Attribute XML” schema is only needed if
application specific attributes are being verified using an XML schema.
4.1.1 Editors
An editor is used to draw TACOMA diagrams. An example of a TACOMA diagram
is shown in figure 4.2. This is a relatively simple diagram where one user, U1, is
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Figure 4.1: TACOMA framework
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given access to the children of node 1.2 and the node 1.4 in entity E1. This gives the
following set of access control rules: U1E1 = {(1.2,c, i),(1.4,n, i)}.
If this diagram is applied to the tree T shown in figure 4.3, the user U1 would be
granted access to nodes 2,4,5 and 6 or using the notation introduced in the previous
chapter we have f (T,U1E1) = {2,4,5,6}.
1.2 1.4
U1
E1
Figure 4.2: TACOMA diagram
1
32
5 6
9
4
7 8
Figure 4.3: Tree structure
The editor used for drawing TACOMA diagrams can be specially designed for
this task in which case it will support storing the diagrams directly in the TACOMA
XML format. It is however also possible to use a standard UML editor which stores
diagrams in the XMI[39] format. An XSLT schema can then be used to translate
XMI files to TACOMA XML files.
The advantage of being able to use a standard UML editor is that there already
exist good editors on the market, both commercial and open source. Many UML
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editors also have good support for team work where multiple people can work on the
same diagrams. This is an advantage for large systems where different administrators
can be responsible for different parts of a TACOMA diagram.
4.1.2 TACOMA Parser
The TACOMA parser takes a TACOMA XML file as input, verifies the XML file
against the TACOMA XML schema and generates a list of access rules for each
user and entity in the diagram. These access control rules are then forwarded to the
TACOMA ACL optimizer.
The parser can also use an application specific XML schema to further validate
the TACOMA diagram. Since TACOMA has been designed as a generic language
usable for specifying access control for a wide range of applications and systems,
most attributes in the language are generic. An application specific XML schema
can put further restrictions on the values of attributes.
4.1.3 TACOMA ACL optimizer
The list of access rules generated by the TACOMA Parser will often not be optimized
when it comes to having the minimum number of access rules. The goal of the
TACOMA ACL optimizer is to take the list of access control rules and for each
user and entity find the fully optimized UE . To do this the optimizer needs the full
description of the tree T that the access control rules are applied to.
It is not always possible to get full specification of the tree T since T often
changes dynamically and therefor the TACOMA ACL optimizer will not always be
able to fully optimize UE . In many cases it will however be possible to do some
optimization even with a dynamic tree T .
4.1.4 Tree Generator
The Tree Generator provides the description of the tree T that the TACOMA ACL
optimizer needs. This generator must be specifically implemented for the application
that TACOMA is used to specify access control rules for.
For example if TACOMA is used for SNMP then this tree generator would be a
small application that can parse SNMP SMI documents and generate the tree struc-
ture based on them.
4.1.5 ACL Configurator
The ACL Configurator also needs to be implemented specifically for the application
that TACOMA is used to model access control rules for. The ACL Configurator
receives the list of access control rules and uses them to do the appropriate configu-
ration needed to implement the access control according to the TACOMA diagram.
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4.2 Notation
The Tree-based Access Control Modeling Language is a relatively simple graphical
notation with only two relations and eight symbols.
Figure 4.4 shows all the symbols and relations defined in TACOMA.
TableCol
SubtreeNode
User
TableRow
GroupEntity
Children
<<not>>
ExcludeInclude
Figure 4.4: TACOMA symbols and relations
4.2.1 Diagrams
In TACOMA two different types of diagrams are used. One is the top level diagrams
that collect all symbols that define the access rights to users for a specific type of
access like read-only, read-write etc. A top level diagram might contain one or more
group symbols and each group symbol also have a group diagram attached to them
where the content of the group is defined1.
If the access rules for a user are different for different access types, there will be
multiple main diagrams with one diagram for each access type. If the access rules
are the same for multiple access types, only one main diagram is needed.
4.2.2 Relations
There are only two relations defined in TACOMA, include and exclude. The include
relation is used to include nodes in the access rights while the exclude relation is used
for excluding them.
1See the description of the group symbol for more details.
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4.2.3 Symbols
The description of each available symbol in TACOMA is divided into two sections.
The first section provides a general introduction to the semantics of the symbol and
gives an example on how to use it. The second section describes the attributes of
the symbol. Some attributes are common for all symbols and the description of
these attributes are repeated for each symbol so that the description of all symbols is
complete without having to reference a description of another symbol.
The description of attributes is also divided into two parts. First there is a general
description of what the attribute is used for and then there is a formal definition of the
syntax of the value(s) the attribute can be assigned. This formal definition is written
using the syntax of XML Schema[40]. Many attributes are optional and the names
of these are written using an italic font.
User
The user symbol represents one or more users that are allowed access to an entity.
If the user symbol represents multiple users then all the users will have the same
access rights. A user can not belong to more than one user symbol in the same main
diagram.
It is possible for a user symbol to include or exclude user rights of other users.
Figure 4.5 shows one example of this. In this figure user U1 will have the following
access rights: U1 = U2+U3−U4. Assume that each user has access to some nodes
in the tree structure shown in figure 4.3 so that f (U2) = {5,9}, f (U3) = {6} and
f (U4) = {9}. User U1 would then have access to f (U1) = {5,6}.
U2 U4
U1
U3
<<not>>
Figure 4.5: TACOMA user
Only a single instance of the same user symbol can have any children. All other
user symbols that references the same user symbol instance are not allowed any chil-
dren. Figure 4.6 shows a TACOMA diagram that is not legal because user symbol
U1 has two instances that both have children. To be a legal TACOMA diagram it
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would have to be changed as shown in figure 4.7 where only one single instance has
children and the second instance simply refers to it.
1.4.7
1.2.6
U2
U1
U1
E1
E1
Figure 4.6: Illegal TACOMA user symbol example
This restriction is enforced so that there will only be one single place where the
access rules of a user is specified.
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in a TACOMA
document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of user. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
securityName, password, certificate these attributes are used to specify the access
control specific username of a user and password or certificate. This
username is the name a user must use to authenticate himself to an en-
tity when he want to access it.
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1.4.71.2.6
U2U1
U1
E1
Figure 4.7: Legal TACOMA user symbol example
Passwords will normally only be used to set a default password when
creating new users through TACOMA. When using a certificate, the cer-
tificate will, depending on the implementation, either contain the certifi-
cate itself or a pointer to where the ACL Configurator can get hold of
it.
<element name="securityName">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="password"
type="string" use="optional"/>
<attribute name="certificate"
type="string" use="optional"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
all if this attribute is set, then the user symbol represents all users defined
in the TACOMA diagram.
<element name=’’all’’>
<simpleType>
<restriction base="string">
<enumeration value="yes"/>
<enumeration value="no"/>
4.2. NOTATION 27
</restriction>
</simpleType>
</element>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="required"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
Entity
The entity symbol specifies which entity or entities a user has access to. An entity
identifies where the access control rules should be configured. It can be a PC, a router
or any other type of equipment where the access control needs to be configured. The
entity symbol can also represent software. For example if a server is running two
HTTP servers, the entity symbol must uniquely identify which server that should be
configured.
If there are multiple entity symbols in a TACOMA subtree, the top entity symbol
will act as a filter including or excluding only access control rights for that specific
entity. An example of this is shown in figure 4.8. In this diagram user U2 is given ac-
cess to node 1 for both entity E1 and E2. User U1 then includes the access right from
user U2 through an entity symbol E1. This means that user U1 will only include the
access rights belonging to entity E1 from user U2. The following access control rules
apply to this diagram: U2E1 = {(1, i,n)},U2E2{(1, i,n)}) and U1E1 = {(1, i,n)}.
It is also possible to explicitly remove an entity from the access rules as shown
in figure 4.9. In this figure we can see that user U1 includes the access rights from
user U2 and then excludes entity E2. This means that user U1 inherits all the access
rules from user U2 but then removes all rules related to entity E2. This will result in
the exact same access control rules as the previous figure 4.8.
Figure 4.10 shows another important aspect of the entity symbol. In this figure
user U1 includes the access rights of user U2 and adds the node 1.3. There is no entity
symbol before the node 1.3, so this means that the node will be added to all entities
already included in the access rights at deeper levels of the TACOMA diagram. We
then get U1E1 = {(1, i,n),(1.3, i,n)} and U1E2 = {(1, i,n),(1.3, i,n)}.
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1
U2
U1
E2
E1
E1
Figure 4.8: TACOMA entity
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1
U2
U1
E2
E2E1
<<not>>
Figure 4.9: Exclude TACOMA entity
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1
1.3
U1
U2
E2E1
Figure 4.10: Global TACOMA entity
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Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in a TACOMA
document..
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of entity. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
addr Name or IP address of entity. If the application needs more than the
address to uniquely identify the entity, additional application specific
attributes should be used.
<element name="addr" type="string"/>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="required"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
Node
The node symbol is used to include or exclude a single node in the access rights. To
identify the exact node within the tree structure an extended object identifier (EOID)
is used. The use of a node symbol has already been shown in figure 4.8.
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in a TACOMA
document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of node symbol. No formal meaning.
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<element name="name" type="string"/>
eoid EOID of the node. The exact syntax of en EOID depends on the system
TACOMA is being used for configuring access control for. The EOID is
therefor defined as a string.
<element name="eoid" type="string"/>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name"
type="string" use="required"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
Children
The children symbol includes or excludes the children of a node in the access rights.
An EOID is used to identify the parent node.
Figure 4.11 shows a TACOMA diagram using a children symbol. This figure
simply includes the children of node 1.2 in entity E1 which gives the following access
rule: U1E1 = {1.2, i,c} . Applying this access rule to the tree structure T shown in
figure 4.3 gives access to the following nodes: f (T,U1E1) = {2,5,6}.
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in a TACOMA
document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of children symbol. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
eoid EOID of the parent node of the children. The exact syntax of en EOID
depends on the system TACOMA is being used for configuring access
control for. The EOID is therefor defined as a string.
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 1.2
U1
E1
Figure 4.11: TACOMA children symbol
<element name="name" type="string"/>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="required"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
Subtree
The subtree symbol includes or excludes a subtree in the access rights. An EOID is
used to identify the root node of the subtree. Just as with the children symbol, if only
proper descendants should be included the root node of the subtree should explicitly
be excluded.
Figure 4.12 shows an example on how to use the subtree symbol. This figure
provides the user U1 access to the subtree with root node 1.2 in entity E1, U1E1 =
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{1.2, i,s}. Applying this access rule to the tree structure T shown in figure 4.3 gives
access to the following nodes: f (T,U2E1) = {2,5,6,9}.
 1.2 
U1
E1
Figure 4.12: TACOMA subtree symbol
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in the TACOMA
document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of children symbol. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
eoid EOID of the parent node of the children. The exact syntax of en EOID
depends on the system TACOMA is being used for configuring access
control for. The EOID is therefor defined as a string.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
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<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="required"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
Table row
The table row symbol represents a row in a virtual table. Using tables is a common
method for organizing data but the exact method for representing a table in a tree
structure can vary depending on the system that is being configured.
In SNMP, tables are a very common. The EOID for a cell in a generic table is
written as T.C.I where T is the EOID for the table, C is the column and I is the index
of the row. To give access to a specific row in a table, T and I will be constant and C
will be a wildcard so that all columns of the table is included.
Figure 4.13 shows how table 4.1 can be represented in a tree structure in SNMP.
In this figure node T is the base node for the table, nodes C1, C2 and C3 are the
columns of the table and nodes I1, I2 and I3 are the index values representing the
rows. All nodes with the same index belongs to the same row. This is illustrated in
the figure by nodes with gray background which all belong to the same row.
B C1 C2 C3
I1
I2
I3
Table 4.1: Table example
T
C1
I1 I2 I3
C2
I1 I2 I3
C3
I1 I2 I3
Figure 4.13: Table tree structure
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Figure 4.14 shows an example of how to use the table row symbol. This figure
simply includes one row in table T from entity E1. Assuming that the table row
symbol has an attribute index = I2, the diagram gives the following access rules:
U1E1 = {T. ∗ .I2, i,n}. Applied to table T in figure 4.13 this rule would provide
access to f (T,U1E1) = {T.C1.I2,T.C2.I2,T.C3.I2}.
T
U1
E1
Figure 4.14: TACOMA table row symbol
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in the TACOMA
document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of table symbol. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
eoid EOID of the table. The exact syntax of en EOID depends on the system
TACOMA is being used for configuring access control for. The EOID is
therefor defined as a string.
<element name="eoid" type="string"/>
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index index of the row in the table. Uses the same syntax as an EOID.
<element name="index" type="string"/>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="required"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
Table column
This symbol is almost identical to Table row except that it represents a table column
instead of a row. For some applications like SNMP, this symbol is redundant since
table columns can be addressed using a simple subtree symbol. Other applications
or systems might represent a table in a different manner in the tree structure and this
symbol might be needed to be able to represent a table column.
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in the TACOMA
document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of table symbol. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
eoid EOID of the table. The exact syntax of en EOID depends on the system
TACOMA is being used for configuring access control for. The EOID is
therefor defined as a string.
<element name="eoid" type="string"/>
index index of the column in the table. Uses the same syntax as an EOID.
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<element name="index" type="string"/>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="required"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
Group
The group symbol is used for grouping together related symbols to make diagrams
easier to read and to be able to reuse parts of a TACOMA diagram. A group symbol
can have its own diagram attached to it where the content of the group is drawn.
Figure 4.15 shows an example on how the group symbol can be used. In this
figure user U1 is given access to everything that is defined inside the group G. User
U2 is given access to everything in group G except node 1.4. The contents of group G
is shown in figure 4.16. With this figure we get the following access rights: U1E1 =
{(1.2, i,c),(1.4, i,n)},U1E2 = {(1, i,n)}, U2E1 = {(1.2, i,c)}and U2E2 = {(1, i,n)}.
Figure 4.17 shows how the diagram in figure 4.15 would look if the contents of
group G was drawn directly without the use of a group symbol.
GG
1.4
U1 U2
<<not>>
Figure 4.15: TACOMA group symbol
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1.2 11.4
E2E1
Figure 4.16: TACOMA group contents
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in the TACOMA
document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of group. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="required"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
4.3 EOID functions
To be able to create more generic access control rules it is possible to use various type
of functions inside an EOID. The table row symbol is a very good example on how
40
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this can useful. In this symbol it is possible to use some predefined functions when
specifying the index attribute of the table row symbol. The predefined functions will
then return all or part of the EOID used as index for the row. The exact functions
available will depend om the implementation of TACOMA and which type of appli-
cation access control is being configured for. Three functions that can commonly be
used are:
userID() many systems have a unique integer, user ID, that identifies users for the
system. This function returns the user ID of users.
userSecurityName() returns the security name of a user.
attr(attrName) returns the user attributes with the name attrName.
As an example on how the above functions can be used, assume that user U1 in figure
4.14 has a user id of 1000. The table row symbol has the following EOID as an index
value: 1.2.userID().3. The full EOID that will be used for user U1 in the access rights
will then be 1.2.1000.3.
If the function used in the index returns multiple values, one row for each value
will be included. This can for example be when a user has more than one instance of
an attribute used by the attr(attrName) function.
The userSecurityName() and attr() functions are examples of functions that can
be processed by the TACOMA parser while the userID() function must be processed
by the application specific ACL Configurator.
4.4 Hierarchy
The example diagrams that have already been shown clearly demonstrates the hierar-
chical nature of TACOMA. TACOMA itself follows a tree-based structure to specify
access control. In this hierarchy it is easy to encounter situations where access con-
trol rules at different layers in the hierarchy are in conflicts. Rules at one level may
provide access to some resources while rules at another level can deny access to the
same resources. The general rule in TACOMA is that access control rules should be
calculated using a bottom-up approach where the access rules for each user symbol
is calculated by recursively going deeper in the tree to find the end nodes and then
calculate the access rules in a bottom-up fashion.
Rules at higher levels supersedes rules at lower levels and if there are any dis-
crepancies at the same level, rules excluding access rights have priority over include
rules.
Figure 4.18 shows an example of some conflicts. To decide the access rules for
user U1 and U2 in this diagram we start at the end nodes and on each level include
rules are applied first and then exclude since they have higher priority. User U2 first
includes the entity symbol E1 which again includes the subtree symbol 1.2. This pro-
vides the access rule U2E1 = {1.2, i,s}. User U2 then excludes the subtree 1.2.5 from
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1.2
1.2
 1.2.5
1.2.5U2
U1
E1
<<not>>
<<not>>
Figure 4.18: TACOMA hierarchy conflicts
all entities already included in the access rights, U2E1 = ({1.2, i,s},{1.2.5,e,s}). If
these two rules are applied to the tree structure T in figure 4.3, then user U2 has
access to the following nodes: f (T,U2) = {2,5,6,9}−{5,9}= {2,6}.
User U1 starts by including all the access rights from U2, then includes node
1.2.5 and excludes the children of node 1.2:
U1E1 = ({1.2, i,s},{1.2.5,e,s},{1.2.5, i,n},{1.2,e,c}).
Since exclude have higher priority than include, user U1 do not have access to
any nodes since: f (T,U1) = {2,6}+{5}−{2,5,6}= {}.
4.5 User administration
It is possible to also let TACOMA create and delete users in a system. If this is done,
then all creating and deleting of user accounts should be done through TACOMA and
not through other mechanisms.
To create a user it is enough to just add a new user symbol where either a pass-
word or certificate is added. The ACL Configurator will detect that the new user
does not exist in the system being configured, and will then automatically create a
new user. System specific attributes for the user, like full name, email address etc.
can be added to the user symbol using one or more attr attributes.
If TACOMA is also set up to delete users, then it is enough to just delete all
references of a user in the TACOMA diagram. The ACL Configurator should retrieve
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a full list of users from the system and delete the ones that are not references in the
TACOMA diagram.
4.6 RBAC support
TACOMA was designed to be as simple as possible to learn and use and the number
of symbol was therefor kept to a minimum. Because of this there is no inherent
support for role based access control.
It is however fully possible to use the concept of roles by taking full advantage
of the group symbol in TACOMA. By following a design paradigm for TACOMA
diagrams where users are never given direct access to any resources except through
group symbols, then the group symbols will act as roles and by assigning the group
to a use symbol through an include relation, the user is assigned this role.
4.7 XACML support
It is fully possible to create simple XACML policies based on TACOMA diagrams.
Instead of letting the “TACOMA ACL Configurator” module configure access con-
trol directly in an entity, it can create a set of simple XACML policies. It is however
not possible to take advantage of the more advanced features of XACML like check-
ing the values of attributes when policies are evaluated or forming policy hierarchies.
4.8 Formal specification
The description so far of TACOMA has been an informal specification of the lan-
guage to help understand how the language works and how it can be used. A more
formal specification that defines how the various symbols can be connected to each
other are provided as a metamodel and as an XML schema. These two formal speci-
fications are able to model most aspects of the TACOMA language.
4.8.1 Meta model
Figure 4.19 shows the metamodel for the TACOMA language. What this metamodel
shows is that you can have two types of diagrams, MainDiagram and GroupDiagram,
and both diagrams can contain both symbols and relations. At least one symbol in
each diagram is required.
Further more the metamodel shows that only group symbols without a diagram
and user symbols can have both include and exclude relations originating from them.
The entity symbol can only have include relation from it and all symbols can have
both include and exclude relations to them.
The model also shows that a user symbol that references another user symbol can
not have any children.
44
CH
A
PTER
4
.TACO
M
A
SymbolWithoutRelation
GroupWithoutDiagram
SymbolWithRelation
GroupWithDiagram
GroupDiagramMainDiagram
TableRowDiagram Children
Relation
UserRef
Exclude Include
Subtree
Symbol
User
Entity
Node
reference
1 0..*
−from1..*
0..1contains
1..*
1..*
−belong
−to
0..*
0..1
−from
1..*
0..1
Fig
u
re
4
.19
:TACO
M
A
M
eta
M
od
el
4.8. FORMAL SPECIFICATION 45
4.8.2 XML Schema
As a help to the meta model, there is also an XML schema that formally describes
the TACOMA language. This schema puts some further restrictions on the language
that the meta model is not capable of modeling.
The most important aspect of the XML schema is that it sets requirements for
unique IDs of all symbols and requires that reference symbols are actually referenc-
ing an existing instance of the symbol.
Reading the schema can also help users further understand the structure of TACOMA
diagrams. The XML Schema for TACOMA can be found in Appendix D.
4.8.3 Shortcomings of the formal specification
While the meta model in combination with the XML schema manages to formally
specify most aspects of the TACOMA language, there are some issues that are not
possible to formally specify using these methods.
One issue is dependency loops. In figure 4.20 we can see that user U1 includes the
access rights of user U2 at the same time as user U2 includes the rights of U1. It can
be argued that in a situation like this, both users should simply be assigned the same
access rights so that we get U1E1 = U2E1 = ({1.2.6, i,n},{1.4, i,n}). Doing this can
however quickly lead to inconsistency, especially when the dependency loops occurs
in different diagrams, so it is considered illegal in TACOMA to have dependency
loops.
1.2.6 1.4
U1
U1 U2
U2
E1 E1
Figure 4.20: TACOMA dependency loop
Another less sever problem with the formal specification of TACOMA, is that
both the meta model and the XML schema permits diagrams that do not make any
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sense as demonstrated in figure 4.21. In this diagram we can see user U1 assigned
access to node 1.2 but since there is no entity symbol the diagram does not actually
provide access to any resources.
1.4
U1
Figure 4.21: TACOMA diagram without entity symbol
4.9 TACOMA XML format
The following XML document shows how figure 4.15 and 4.16 would be written
when adhering to the TACOMA XML Schema defined in appendix D.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1" ?>
<tacoma xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns="http://www.oslebo.com/thesis/tacoma"
xmlns:tacoma="http://www.oslebo.com/thesis/tacoma"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.oslebo.com/thesis/tacoma tacoma.xsd"
version="1.0">
<delimiter>.</delimiter>
<wildcard>*</wildcard>
<escape>\</escape>
<allSymbols>
<user id="U1">
<name>U1</name>
<securityName password="pass1">u1</securityName>
</user>
<user id="U2">
<name>U2</name>
<securityName password="pass2">u2</securityName>
</user>
<groupWithDiagram id="G" diagram="GD">
<name>G</name>
</groupWithDiagram>
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<entity id="E1">
<name>E</name>
<address>10.0.0.1</address>
</entity>
<entity id="E2">
<name>E</name>
<address>10.0.0.2</address>
</entity>
<children id="C1.2">
<name>C1.2</name>
<eoid>1.2</eoid>
</children>
<node id="N1.4">
<name>N1.4</name>
<eoid>1.4</eoid>
</node>
<node id="N1">
<name>N1</name>
<eoid>1</eoid>
</node>
</allSymbols>
<mainDiagram id="m">
<accessType>read</accessType>
<name>Read Access</name>
<symbols>
<symbol ref="U1"/>
<symbol ref="U2"/>
<symbol ref="G"/>
<symbol ref="N1.4"/>
</symbols>
<relations>
<include>
<from>U1</from>
<to>G</to>
</include>
<include>
<from>U2</from>
<to>G</to>
</include>
<exclude>
<from>U2</from>
<to>N1.4</to>
</exclude>
</relations>
</mainDiagram>
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<groupDiagram id="GD">
<symbols>
<symbol ref="E1"/>
<symbol ref="E2"/>
<symbol ref="N1"/>
<symbol ref="N1.4"/>
<symbol ref="C1.2"/>
</symbols>
<relations>
<include>
<from>E1</from>
<to>C1.2</to>
</include>
<include>
<from>E1</from>
<to>N1.4</to>
</include>
<include>
<from>E2</from>
<to>N1</to>
</include>
</relations>
</groupDiagram>
</tacoma>
Figure 4.22 shows the overall structure of the XML document. The root element
of the document is “TACOMA” which contains some attributes that define the XML
Schema that should be used for validating the document.
The first tag is called allSymbols and contains the definition of all symbols found
in all diagrams in the TACOMA XML file. So under this tag we can find the users
U1 and U2, the group symbol G, the entities E1 and E2, the children symbol 1.2 and
the two nodes 1.4 and 1.
Next follows the two diagrams, the main diagram and the group diagram. Both
diagram has the same structure with first one tag called symbols which contains one
reference for each symbol in the diagram to symbols defined under allSymbols. Next
follows the tag relations which contain one entry for each include and exclude rela-
tion that are part of the diagram.
If there had been other access types with different access rights, there would have
been multiple “mainDiagram” elements.
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Figure 4.22: TACOMA XML structure
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Chapter 5
Policy Tree-based Access control
Modeling Language
This chapter provides a detailed description of the Policy Tree-based Access control
Modeling Language (PTACOMA). It starts by providing a general introduction to
the concepts of domains and policies. It then describes the main components that
are needed to use PTACOMA and how they differ from the ones used in TACOMA.
All symbols and relations used in PTACOMA are described in detail and several
examples on how the language can be used are provided together with a detailed
description of the PTACOMA metamodel.
5.1 Introduction to domains and policies
This is just a general introduction that describes the fundamental principals behind
domains and policies. For more detailed information about this subject see references
[41, 42, 43, 44].
5.1.1 Policy based management
In large networks there can be thousands of entities and users that have to be managed
in various ways. Manually configuring these large numbers of entities and users is
not feasible. One common method to handle this is to use policy based management.
In [41] a policy is defined as a rule that governs the choice in behavior of a
system. Policies are usually divided into two main categories, obligation policies and
authorization policies. Obligation policies are used to define management actions
that must or must not be performed, such as when to do backup, what to do when
creating new users or installing new equipment etc.
Authorization policies defines which operations users are allowed or not allowed
to perform on managed entities and they can control which information should be
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available to users. This means that authorization policies are used for specifying the
access control setup in entities.
A third category of policies is also sometimes used[42], namely security policies.
Security policies are special types of obligation policies used for defining what to do
when certain security incidents occurs, for example what should be done when a user
tries more than three times to type in correct password, what happens when a DOS
attack is discovered, etc.
Policies can be abstract high level policies defined by business goals or various
agreements like service level agreements or they can be low level policies describing
certain low level entities. Usually policies start out as high level and then they are
refined into low level that can be mapped to specific technologies. This refinement is
not easy since one main goal of policy based management is automatic configuration
of entities based on the policies. To help with this a lot of work have been done to
define languages that can be used for specifying policies in a formal way. A good
overview of some of these languages is given in [42].
5.1.2 Policy attributes
Regardless of which level a policy is on, high or low level, it is commonly agreed
that they all have some basic attributes in common:
Modality specifies the type of policy. In [41] the following modes are defined:
positive authorization, negative authorization, positive obligation and
negative obligation. Positive and negative authorization policies will
permit or deny access to resources while positive and negative obliga-
tion policies will require or deter some kind of action.
Subjects specifies which users or subjects that this policy applies to. This means
the users that are authorized or obligated to do what the policy specifies.
Targets specifies the managed resources at which the policy is directed. For
authorization policies the targets specifies which resources that should
be granted or denied access to.
Action this is also sometimes called the policy goal. It specifies which type of
action that is controlled by the policy. The action can for example be
read a file, write to a file etc. It can often be difficult to map high level
policies to specific actions.
Constraints this attribute places additional restriction on the applicability of the pol-
icy. Some typical constraints can be to limit the validity of policies to
specific times of the day, to allow access only as long as the resource is
not too heavily loaded etc.
To avoid having to specify policies for each managed entity or each user, subjects and
targets are usually expressed using domains, roles and types. A domain is a grouping
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of resources for management purposes. This grouping can be based on function-
ality, physical location etc. Roles are used for users or subjects and represents the
responsibilities that a user have. Type is used for managed entities and describes the
capabilities of an entity. Both users and entities can have several roles or types.
5.1.3 Policy servers
As already stated, one of the ideas behind policy based management is to avoid hav-
ing to configure all managed entities manually. To manage this, various types of
policy servers are often used. A policy server is configured by the manager with the
correct policies, and then it is the policy server that configures the managed entities
on behalf of the manager. Figure 5.1 shows an example of how this works.
When a new managed entity or user is added, the policy server should ideally be
able to detect this automatically and then configure the entities as necessary to fulfill
the current policies. How this is done in real world networks depends heavily on the
applications and services that are being managed.
Managed entities can also have built in support for policy servers and query them
in real time for access control decisions. One example of this is the combination of
the Policy Enforcement Point and the Policy Decision Point in XACML.
Policy servers are also well suited for supporting policies with dynamic con-
straints. For example it is possible to create a policy that says users are only allowed
access as long as the load of the system is under a certain level.
5.2 PTACOMA overview
The Policy Tree-based Access Control Modeling Language is a version of TACOMA
that scales better to higher numbers of managed entities, users and nodes in the tree
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structures. Figure 5.2 shows the necessary components for using PTACOMA to con-
figure access control. Several of the components are the same as for TACOMA and
only the boxes with gray background are different. An editor is used to to draw
PTACOMA diagrams and just as for TACOMA it is possible to use standard UML
editors to draw the diagrams. The XML format used to store diagrams is different
compared to TACOMA so that it is able to store the extra symbols and relations that
are available in the PTACOMA language.
The PTACOMA parser takes a PTACOMA XML file and generates a list of ac-
cess control rules that are sent to the same ACL Optimizer that is used with TACOMA.
The ACL Configurator is also the same in both languages. This means that if support
for a specific application or system has been implemented for TACOMA, the same
implementation can also be used with PTACOMA.
PTACOMA also has one new optional module called Policy Configurator. Since
PTACOMA is a policy based language it can be used for configuring policy based
systems directly. If it is used for this, PTACOMA diagrams should not be converted
to access control lists for the ACL Configurator but instead policies should be sent
directly to the Policy Configurator.
5.2.1 Policy-based paradigm
The main advantage of PTACOMA compared to TACOMA is scalability. To achieve
better scalability PTACOMA uses a policy-based paradigm and all policies are low
level positive or negative authorization policies. Figure 5.3 shows an example of a
PTACOMA diagram. In this figure there is one single policy, P1, that grants access
to the children of node 1.2 and node 1.4 in entity E1 for users with the role R1. We
can also see that one single user, U1, is assigned this role. The access rules for this
policy is: U1E1 = {(1.2, i,c),(1.4, i,n)}
If this policy is applied to the tree structure that was shown in figure 4.3, policy
P1 would provide the following access rights: f (T,U1E1) = {2,4,5,6}
This is the same access rights as the introduction example of TACOMA shown
in figure 4.2 and demonstrates the fact that for simple access rules, TACOMA can be
more intuitive and easier to use. The real advantage of PTACOMA comes when the
number of users, entities and complexity of rules increases.
Attributes of the policy P1 specifies what type of access that should be allowed,
for example if it is read only, read-write etc. In TACOMA it is necessary to have
distinct diagrams for each type of access while in PTACOMA the type of access is
specified on a per policy basis.
5.3 Notation
The Policy Tree-based Access Control Model Language uses all of the same symbols
as in the simpler Tree-structure Access Control Modeling Language and extends this
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Figure 5.2: PTACOMA components
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Figure 5.3: PTACOMA diagram
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Figure 5.4: PTACOMA symbols
with several more relations and 6 symbols. Figure 5.4 shows all the symbols defined
in PTACOMA.
5.3.1 Relations
PTACOMA uses the include and exclude relation in the same way as in TACOMA.
In addition to these to relations, PTACOMA also have a subject relation that is used
for specifying the subjects of a policy. The include relation can not be used for this
as it can lead to confusion about what the subjects and targets are. As an example,
consider the policy shown in figure 5.5. In this figure we see a policy that uses two
groups, G1 and G2, for its subjects and targets. Assuming that these two groups both
contains symbols like roles and entities there has to be a way to tell which group
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should be used for subjects and which should be used for targets. So it is not possible
to use a simple include relation for both groups and to resolve this, a separate subject
relation has been introduced.
There are also several relations like or, and, xor etc. that is used for domain
modeling. The exact number of these relations depends on the implementation of
PTACOMA.
5.3.2 Symbols
The symbols user, entity, children, node, subtree, table row and table column have
the same attributes as in TACOMA and the usage of the symbols are very similar.
The description of these symbols are therefore not repeated here and can instead be
found in chapter 4. The exact usage of all symbols are described in detail in the
description of the PTACOMA metamodel in section 5.4.
Policy
The policy symbol specifies a policy and is the main symbol used in PTACOMA to
specify access rights. All policy symbols will have other symbols related to them to
specify subjects, targets and constraints. The basic usage of the policy symbol was
shown in figure 5.3.
A policy can specify the maximum, minimum or exact access rights. When a
policy specifies the maximum access allowed for a role, then policies at lower level
domains or groups are allowed to remove some of the access rights. With a minimum
policy, other policies at lower levels can add to the access rights. With exact rules no
policies at lower levels are able to make any changes to the access rights.
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in a PTA-
COMA document.
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<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of entity. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
accessType Type of access, e.g. read-only, read-write etc.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
policyType Type of policy. Can be maximum access, minimum access or exact ac-
cess.
<element name="policyType">
<xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:restriction base="xsd:string">
<xsd:enumeration value="min"/>
<xsd:enumeration value="max"/>
<xsd:enumeration value="exact"/>
</xsd:restriction>
</xsd:simpleType>
</element>
priority sets the priority of a policy. This can be used for specifying the order of
which policies on the same level is processed.
<element name="priority" type="integer"/>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="mandatory"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
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Domain
The domain symbol represents a collection of other symbols that are part of the same
administrative control. This symbol can be considered a more formal collection of
other symbols compared to the group symbol.
A domain symbol has its own diagram attached to it where the content of the
domain is drawn. The domain symbol also acts as a filter where the children symbols
of the domain is then limited in scope to only the domain or domains specified by the
domain symbol.
When using the scope attribute of the domain symbol, it is possible to represent
multiple domains by one single domain symbol. This makes it is possible to create
more generic high level policies. If users from multiple domains are assigned the
same role, it is possible to create policies that provides access to entities only in their
own domain, in all domains except their own etc.
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in a PTA-
COMA document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of entity. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
scope specifies the scope of the domain symbol.
<element name="scope">
<xsd:simpleType>
<xsd:restriction base="xsd:string">
<xsd:enumeration value="this"/>
<xsd:enumeration value="all"/>
<xsd:enumeration value="allExceptThis"/>
<xsd:enumeration value="allExceptOwn"/>
<xsd:enumeration value="siblings"/>
<xsd:enumeration value="children"/>
</xsd:restriction>
</xsd:simpleType>
</element>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
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<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="mandatory"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
Group
The group symbol has two different semantics in PTACOMA. First of all it can rep-
resent a collection of one or more other elements. This is used to group together
symbols that have something in common or that will be referenced multiple times.
This is identical to the use of the group symbol in TACOMA.
It can also be used for advanced arithmetic domain modeling where it is possible
to express statements like: all users part of domain A but not domain B.
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in a PTA-
COMA document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of group. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="mandatory"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
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Role
The role symbol is used to create generic policies for all users that have this role. The
advantage of using the role symbol is that administrators can create general policies
based on the responsibilities of users instead of having to specify policies for each
user separately.
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in a PTA-
COMA document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of role. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
all if set, this role symbol represents all roles. Can be used to create policies
that are valid for all users.
<element name="all">
<simpleType>
<restriction base="string">
<enumeration value="yes"/>
<enumeration value="no"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
</element>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="mandatory"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
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Type
The type symbol is used for creating generic policies for all entities of the same
type. This makes it possible for administrators to create generic policies based on
capabilities of entities instead of having to do detail specification for each entity
separately.
Attributes
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in a PTA-
COMA document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of type. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
all if set, this type symbol represents all types. Can be used to create poli-
cies that are valid for all types of entities.
<element name="all">
<simpleType>
<restriction base="string">
<enumeration value="yes"/>
<enumeration value="no"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
</element>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="mandatory"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
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Policy view
The policy view symbol is used for creating generic policies when the implementa-
tion of entities varies and it is not known in advance the exact access control rules
that are needed to fulfill the policy.
For example one administrator can create a high level policy saying that all users
should be allowed access to read the system load of all entities. Other administra-
tors can then define the details of which nodes in the tree structure that needs to
be accessed to retrieve this information. This way we divide the responsibilities of
defining the access policy from the implementation details of which nodes needs to
be accessed.
Attribute
id Unique ID of symbol. The scope of the ID is all diagrams in a PTA-
COMA document.
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
name name of role. No formal meaning.
<element name="name" type="string"/>
attr extra application specific attribute(s). An attribute has a name and a
value and is a method for including application specific attributes to the
symbol.
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string"
use="mandatory"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
5.4 PTACOMA metamodel
The metamodel for TACOMA was relatively simple and all the semantics of the
language was captured by one single metamodel diagram. PTACOMA is a lot more
advanced and the metamodel now consists of 13 different diagrams that together
captures the semantics of the language. All these metamodels can be found at the
end of this chapter.
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5.4.1 Main diagram
Figure 5.18 shows the metamodel that specifies the contents of the main diagram and
domain diagrams. What this metamodel says is that a main diagram consists of one
or more symbols. These symbols can be a group or domain symbol with diagrams
that contains the same symbols as the main diagram. It can also be a set of symbols
that:
• Specifies separation of duty policies (SDPolicy)
• Specifies access control policies (Policy)
• Assigns users to roles (Role Definition)
• Assigns entities to types (Type Definition)
• Specifies the details of policy views (Policy Views)
All of these sets of symbols are explained in detail in the following sections.
The group symbol in PTACOMA can either have a new diagram associated with
it or it can use include and exclude relations directly to other symbols, similar to the
group symbol in the TACOMA language.
5.4.2 Role definition
A role definition diagram is used for assigning roles to users and the metamodel for
this kind of diagram is shown in Figure 5.19. A role definition starts with a set of
users or domains and then associates these with one or more roles. It is also possible
to collect role symbols in a group and then associate the user symbols with the group.
Figure 5.20 shows the metamodel for specifying users and domains. Users can be
specified by user symbols and group symbols containing users or other groups. It is
also possible to specify a domain symbol which means that all users of that domain
is assigned the role. Instead of a single domain, domain modeling where logical
expression are used for domain arithmetic can also be used..
Figure 5.6 shows an example of a policy that uses the role symbol. In this figure
there is a policy P1 that provides access to the node 1.4 in entity E1 for all users in
domain D1 that have the role R1. The contents of the domain D1 is shown in figure
5.7. In this figure there are three users, U1, U2 and U3, that are all assigned some
roles. As we can see from this diagram, both user U1 and U2 are assigned role R1.
Policy P1 would therefor provide the following access rights: U1E1 = {(1.4, i,n)}
and U2E1 = {(1.4, i,n)}
The metamodel for domain modeling is shown in figure 5.21. In a diagram of this
type it is possible to have group or domain symbols connect with the usual include
and exclude relations as well as logical relations like and, or, xor etc. Figure 5.8
shows an example of this. This diagram is a valid domain modeling diagram that
specifies the rule: (D1and D2)not (D3or D4)
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Figure 5.8: PTACOMA domain arithmetic example - group contents
Figure 5.9 shows how this domain arithmetic can be used in a policy. In this
figure a policy is shown that gives users with the role R1 access to node 1.4 in all
entities belonging to the domains defined in group G1. Assuming that the contents
of group G1 is the domain arithmetic that was shown in figure 5.9, then the role R1
will be given access to node 1.4 in all entities that are part of the domains that fulfill
the rule: (D1and D2)not (D3or D4).
When modeling simpler rules like and, or and not, it is possible to just use the
include end exclude relations as shown in figure 5.10. This figure models the same
expression as before: (D1and D2)not (D3or D4).
The simplest form of a role definition was shown in figure 5.3 where user U1
was assigned the role R1. Figure 5.11 shows some more examples of role definition
diagrams that all adheres to the metamodels shown in this section. In this diagram we
can see that user U2 is assigned the role R1 as well as all roles defined in the group
G1. The group symbol related to the user U2 is a group reference to the definition of
the group that can be found on the right side of the diagram. This definition simply
includes the relation R2 which means that user U2 is assigned the roles R1 and R2.
There is also one graph where domain D1 is assigned role R1. This means that
all users that belongs to domain D1 are assigned the role R1.
The last example shows that user U3 is also assigned role R1 but this is done by
first drawing a domain symbol D2 which then includes user U3. What this means is
that user U3 is assigned role R1 only as long as he is part of domain D2.
5.4.3 Type definition
Type definitions are specified in the same way as roles except that instead of user
symbols, entities are used, and instead of roles, types are used. The metamodel for
type definitions are shown in figure 5.22.
Similar to role definitions, a type definitions starts with entity or domain symbols.
The metamodel for this is shown in figure 5.23.
The metamodel for domain modeling is the same as for role definitions.
5.4. PTACOMA METAMODEL 67
G1
P1
1.4
R1
<<s>>
Figure 5.9: PTACOMA domain arithmetic example
D4
D1
D2
D3
<<not>><<not>>
Figure 5.10: PTACOMA alternative domain arithmetic syntax
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Figure 5.11: PTACOMA role definitions
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5.4.4 Policies
The metamodel for a policy is shown in figure 5.24. As we can see from this meta-
model, a policy consists of the policy symbol with one or more subject relations to
a set of subject symbols and one or more include or exclude relations to constraints
and targets.
A policy subject consists of role, group and domain symbols as shown in the
metamodel in figure 5.25. If just a domain symbol is used, it means that all users
of that domain will be the subject. It is also possible to use domain modeling as
described under the role definition metamodel.
Constraints are a collection of constraint symbols and groups. The metamodel
for this is shown in figure 5.26.
The objects of a policy can be specified using symbols like node, children, sub-
tree etc. in a similar way as access control is specified in the TACOMA language.
The metamodel for this is shown in figure 5.27. In addition to the symbols used in
TACOMA, it is also possible to use domain, type and policy view symbols.
When a type symbol is used instead of an entity, it means that the policy should
include all entities of this type as objects. This is demonstrated in figure 5.12 where
access is granted to users with the role R1 to node 1.4 in all entities of the type T 1 in
domain D1.
The contents of domain D1 is shown in figure 5.13. In this figure there are two en-
tities and we can see that only entity E2 is of the type T 1. The access rules specified
by the policy will then be U1E2 = {(1.4, i,n)}
5.4.5 Separation of duty policies
Separation of duty policies in PTACOMA can be used for creating policies that states
things like a user that is assigned role A can not be assigned role B. The first policy
in figure 5.14 shows an example of the previously mention policy and the second
policy states that all users assigned to role A must also be assigned to role C. The
metamodel for this type of policies is shown in figure 5.28.
A separation of duty policy is specified using the same policy symbol as normal
policies, but only domain and role symbols are used with it to specify the subjects
and objects of the policy. Constraints can also be included to specify constraints like
time of day the policy should be active etc.
5.4.6 Policy view definitions
The metamodel for defining the contents of a policy view is shown in figure 5.29.
A definition like this starts with one or more entity or type symbols that can also
be grouped together in group symbols. It is also possible to do domain modeling as
described earlier. The metamodel for this is shown in figure 5.30.
These entity or type symbols are then connected to a policy view symbol using
the include relation. This means that the specified entities or types all implement
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Figure 5.12: PTACOMA type example
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Figure 5.13: PTACOMA type example - domain contents
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Figure 5.14: PTACOMA separation of duty policy examples
this policy view. The policy view symbol has one or more relations that specifies the
exact nodes in the tree structure needs to be given access to for fulfilling the policy
view. Specifying this is done in the same way as specifying targets for policies.
Figure 5.15 shows a simple policy that uses this symbol. In this figure the role
R1 is given access to all entities in domain D2 that implements the policy view PV 1.
Figure 5.16 shows the contents of the domain D2. There are two entities which
both define the policy view PV1. The resulting access rules from these two diagrams
would then be: U1E1 = {(1.4, i,n)} and U1E2 = {(1.3.4, i,n)}.
As we can see from this simple example, the policy view symbol is well suited to
create high level policies where the administrator who creates the policy do not need
to know all the minute details of how the access control has to be configured in the
actual entities.
5.5 Domain hierarchy
In PTACOMA there are two possible hierarchies of policies, those that are formed by
using group symbols and those formed by domains. To resolve possible conflicts, the
access rules are calculated using a top-down approach based on the hierarchy formed
by domains. For each domain the hierarchy formed by groups are then calculated.
Policies on a higher level has higher priority than the ones on lower levels and if there
are conflicts on the same level, policies with the most restrictive access control rules
should take precedence.
5.6 Policy conflicts
One issue with a policy based paradigm that can cause problems is conflicts between
multiple policies. Conflicts can happen when multiple policies have overlapping
subjects and/or targets. It is for example possible to have one policy that authorizes
user A access to resource B while another policy denies this. It is also possible to
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PV1
D2
P1
R1
<<s>>
Figure 5.15: PTACOMA policy view example
PV1 PV1
E2E1
1.4 1.3.4
Figure 5.16: PTACOMA policy view example - domain contents
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have conflicts between obligation and authorization policies. An obligation policy
may dictate user A to perform a certain task, while at the same time an authorization
policy denies the necessary access needed to perform the task.
Since many policies are first specified as a high level abstract policies it can often
be difficult to detect conflicts. Most of the formal languages for specifying policies
supports some sort of automatic conflict detection[42], but manual intervention from
managers is often needed.
Since PTACOMA is limited to low level authorization policies directed at only
tree based structures, it is relatively easy to detect policy conflicts. When two policies
with different modality or conflicting constraints that also have some similar subjects
or targets there might be a conflict.
Each policy defined using PTACOMA is converted into simple access control
rules of the format {N, I,S} as described in chapter 3. Each policy P will then have a
set AP that contains all the access control rules. There is a conflict between policies
if for a policy P there exist another policy P′ so that f (T,AP)∪ f (T,AP′) 6= θ and
I 6= I′.
When a conflict is detected, policies that are defined in a higher level of the di-
agram hierarchy will take precedence over policies in lower levels. In PTACOMA
it is possible to specify maximum, minimum and exact access policies. Maximum
policies specifies the maximum resources a user should have access to and if a pol-
icy at lower levels grants more access, this access is limited to what the maximum
policy at the higher level specifies. A minimum access policy specifies the minimum
resources a user should have access to. If a policy at lower levels tries to restrict the
access rights of a user further, then the policy at the higher level will take precedence
and increase the access rights. Exact access policies, specifies the exact resources a
user should be able to access and policies at lower levels can not changes this.
When conflicts arises, only the access control rules that are in conflict are changed.
If there exist other access control rules that are not in conflict, these will be applied as
normal. With some applications this can cause unexpected results, so an implemen-
tation of PTACOMA should provide a warning to the user when conflicting policies
are detected.
Conflicts at the same level is not resolved automatically and a PTACOMA im-
plementation should give a warning when this happens. One way administrators can
manually solve conflicts is to use the priority attribute of the PTACOMA policy sym-
bol. If an administrator knows there might be conflicts between multiple policies, the
priority attribute can specify which policy should have the highest priority when cal-
culating the access control rights. As this can cause unwanted effects it is a feature
that should be used cautiously.
5.7 Distributed management
One advantage with having multiple domains is that it is possible to distribute the
task of specifying policies. Administrators on higher levels can make broad policies
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while administrators on lower levels can do detailed configuration or further dele-
gate authorization to other sub-domains. To be able to do this requires support for
distributed editing of PTACOMA diagrams by the editor where access to diagrams
can be restricted. Administrators of domains should only have permission to change
diagrams for their own domain.
Many commercial UML editors already supports this today and will be well
suited for doing distributed configuration of PTACOMA access control rules. The
security of doing distributed management is solely dependent on the security of the
editor being used and is not a part of the PTACOMA specification.
5.8 PTACOMA XML format
Just as for the TACOMA language, PTACOMA also has an XML Schema that acts
as a formal definition of the structure of the language. This schema is available in
Appendix E. The following XML document shows how the PTACOMA diagram in
figure 5.3 would be written when adhering to the PTACOMA XML Schema.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="iso-8859-1"?>
<ptacoma xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xmlns="http://www.oslebo.com/thesis/ptacoma"
xmlns:tacoma="http://www.oslebo.com/thesis/ptacoma"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.oslebo.com/thesis/ptacoma ptacoma.xsd"
version="1.0">
<allSymbols>
<children id="C1.2">
<name>C1.2</name>
<eoid>1.2</eoid>
</children>
<entity id="E1">
<name>E1</name>
<address>10.0.0.1</address>
</entity>
<node id="N1.4">
<name>N1.4</name>
<eoid>1.4</eoid>
</node>
<policy id="P1">
<name>P1</name>
<accessType>read-only</accessType>
<policyType>exact</policyType>
</policy>
<role id="R1">
<name>R1</name>
</role>
<user id="U1">
<name>U1</name>
<securityName password="pass1">u1</securityName>
</user>
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</allSymbols>
<mainDiagram id="m">
<roleDef>
<symbols>
<symbol ref="R1"/>
</symbols>
<usersAndDomains>
<symbols>
<symbol ref="U1"/>
</symbols>
</usersAndDomains>
<relations>
<include>
<from>U1</from>
<to>R1</to>
</include>
</relations>
</roleDef>
<policyDef>
<symbols>
<symbol ref="P1"/>
</symbols>
<subjects>
<symbols>
<symbol ref="R1"/>
</symbols>
</subjects>
<targets>
<symbols>
<symbol ref="E1"/>
<symbol ref="C1.2"/>
<symbol ref="N1.4"/>
</symbols>
<relations>
<include>
<from>E1</from>
<to>C1.2</to>
</include>
<include>
<from>E1</from>
<to>N1.4</to>
</include>
</relations>
</targets>
<subject>
<from>P1</from>
<to>R1</to>
</subject>
<relations>
<include>
<from>P1</from>
<to>E1</to>
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</include>
</relations>
</policyDef>
</mainDiagram>
</ptacoma>
Figure 5.17 shows the overall structure of the XML document. It follows the
same basic structure as TACOMA. The root element is ptacoma and then the allSym-
bols tag follows that includes a list of all symbols found in the PTACOMA document.
In this case we can see the definition of the user symbol U1, the role symbol R1, the
policy symbol P1, the entity symbol E1, the children symbol C1.2 and the node
symbol N1.4.
Next follows the main diagram where the role and policy is defined. In this
diagram there is first a roleDef tag which is used for assigning user U1 to the role R1.
This is done by first specifying that role R1 is part of the roleDef tag and then define
user U1 under the tag usersAndDomains. This structure follows the metamodels for
PTACOMA. The last section under roleDef is relations which simply has one single
include relation that ties user U1 with the role R1.
The policy definition specified inside the policyDef tag defines the actual policy.
This tag first uses a symbols tag to specify that the policy P1 is part of this definition.
Then comes the tags subjects and targets to specify the subjects and targets of the
policy. There is also a subject relation for assigning role R1 as the policy subject and
a relations section that ties the policy P1 with the entity E1. Entity E1 is tied to the
child symbol C1.2 and the node N1.4 inside the targets tag.
The PTACOMA XML Schema also defines several keys and key references to
make sure that the structure of the PTACOMA language is properly captured by the
Schema. There are for example keys that verifies that roles are only assigned to user
symbol and not for example type symbols.
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Figure 5.17: PTACOMA XML structure
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Chapter 6
TACOMA and PTACOMA
comparison
In this chapter the two languages, TACOMA and PTACOMA, are compared based on
complexity, scalability, maintainability and distributed specification of access con-
trol. A detailed example demonstrating some of the differences between the two
languages is also provided.
6.1 Complexity
TACOMA was designed with ease of use as the primary goal and only has eight
symbols and two relations. The only method for organizing diagrams is the use of
groups which allow administrators to collect symbols that have things in common or
to reuse part of diagrams. All this makes TACOMA quite easy to learn and to use and
even users who are not familiar with TACOMA can usually understand the diagrams.
PTACOMA more than doubles the number of symbols and relations and there
are two ways of organizing diagrams, domains and groups. PTACOMA also have a
potentially higher risk of creating conflicts in the access control specification.
Because of this PTACOMA is clearly a more complex language to both learn and
to use and requires more effort from administrators to be properly used.
6.2 Scalability
The scalability of each language is difficult to quantify properly since it depends quite
a lot on how diagrams are constructed. With proper use of groups TACOMA should
be able to scale quite well, however no matter how well diagrams are structured,
administrators still have to manually control and configure each entity.
While TACOMA was designed for ease of use, PTACOMA was designed for
scalability. Using policies together with domains, roles and types it is easier to de-
velop high level access rules that can be refined when needed. PTACOMA also have
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support for the use of policy servers which is an important feature for being able to
scale to systems where there are hundreds of thousands entities and users.
6.3 Maintainability
The maintainability of both TACOMA and PTACOMA depends a lot on the method-
ology used for creating diagrams. Diagrams from both languages can be quite hard
to maintain if they are badly structured. So in this aspect the languages are quite sim-
ilar although PTACOMA makes it easier to distribute the maintenance of diagrams
between domains as explained in the next section. This distribution means that each
administrator only has to maintain some parts of the PTACOMA diagrams.
6.4 Distributed specification of access control
PTACOMA is, with its support for policies and domains, well suited for distributed
specification of access control. It is easy to delegate the detailed control of specifying
access control to domains at lower levels and at the same time keep a high level
control on top levels. The security of distributed specification of access control is
solely dependent on the security built into the editor that is used for drawing the
diagrams.
TACOMA has very little support for this. It is possible to use group symbols to
delegate the responsibilities of updating parts of the diagrams. There is however no
support for letting administrators on a higher level deny or grant access for users on
lower level unless the details of diagrams on lower levels are known.
6.5 Example
The following example shows some of the aspects of TACOMA and PTACOMA
when it comes to scalability, maintainability and distributed specification of access
control. In this example there is a company with two departments, A and B. There
are three users, UserA, UserB1 and UserB2 which belong to department A and B.
All users have access to a group of nodes called G in department A. Initially there
are only one entity EntityA. Figure 6.1 shows the TACOMA diagram for department
A. This shows a single user, UserA, which is being granted access to EntityA. The
access is being limited to the nodes defined in the group called G. The exact contents
of G is not relevant for this discussion but it does not contain any entities, only sub-
tree, children, table-row or node symbols. Figure 6.2 shows the TACOMA diagram
for department B where UserB1 and UserB2 are granted access to the group G in
entity EntityA.
Now assume that department A adds a new entity, EntityA2, which all users
should have access to as well. In TACOMA there are two ways this can be done. The
first method is to simply add the entity as shown in Figure 6.3. This figure shows
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Figure 6.1: Initial department A TACOMA diagram
UserB2UserB1
EntityA
G
Figure 6.2: Initial department B TACOMA diagram
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UserA
EntityA EntityA2
G
Figure 6.3: Modified department A TACOMA diagram
G
EntityA EntityA2
Figure 6.4: TACOMA diagram of GroupA
department A. To give access to UserB1 and UserB2, the same change would also
have to be done in the diagram for department B.
Another method is to add a group symbol, GroupA, with content as shown in fig-
ure 6.4. The diagram for both departments would also have to be changed. Figure 6.5
shows how this will look in the TACOMA diagram for department B. The advantage
of this method is that additional entities can be added by only changing the contents
of GroupA.
Both these methods clearly show that when there are multiple users in different
diagrams accessing the same resources, TACOMA quickly become difficult to use.
Method one requires constant changing to the two separate diagrams every time a
new entity is added or removed, even if it only belongs to one of the departments. The
second method is better since the change to both diagrams only have to be performed
once, but in large TACOMA documents with many levels and diagrams, finding all
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GroupA
UserB2UserB1
Figure 6.5: Modified department B TACOMA diagram
P
UserA
EntityA
G
<<s>>
Figure 6.6: Initial department A PTACOMA diagram
instances that have to be changed can be a challenge. One could argue that a group
symbol should have been used in the first place. While that would have solved the
problem in this example, excessive use of the group symbol can make the TACOMA
diagrams very deep and it is easy to loose control over who has access to what.
The solution to these problems is the policy paradigm that PTACOMA intro-
duces. In the previous example it would be natural to create two distinct domains,
one for each department. Figure 6.6 shows the initial PTACOMA diagram for de-
partment A. In this diagram there is one policy saying that UserA should have access
to the nodes defined in group G for all entities in domain A. Since there is no domain
symbol the policy is valid only for the current domain the policy is drawn in, namely
domain A. Since no entity symbol is used in policy P the policy is valid for all en-
tities belonging to domain A. The diagram also shows that domain A has one entity
EntityA.
Figure 6.7 shows the PTACOMA diagram for department B and contains a single
policy giving UserB1 and UserB2 access to the nodes defined in group G for all
entities in domain A.
When EntityA2 is added to department A, all that is needed is to change the
PTACOMA diagram for department A as shown in figure 6.8. This will automatically
allow access for UserB1 and UserB2 as well.
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A
P2
UserB1 UserB2
G
<<s>> <<s>>
Figure 6.7: Initial department B PTACOMA diagram.
P
UserA
EntityA
G
EntityA2
<<s>>
Figure 6.8: Modified department A PTACOMA diagram
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B
P3
UserB1 *
G
<<not>>
<<s>>
<<not>>
Figure 6.9: Blocking users from department B
TACOMA PTACOMA
Complexity + -
Scalability - +
Maintainability (+) +
Distributed specification - +
Table 6.1: TACOMA and PTACOMA weak and strong points
Another advantage with PTACOMA is that the administrator of department A
can easily block access to all entities in department A from users in department B. In
TACOMA this is only possible on a per user basis. Figure 6.9 shows a PTACOMA
diagram with a policy which dictates that access to all entities are blocked for all
users in department B except UserB1. The role symbol named ∗ represents a role
symbol that has the all attribute set and represents all users.
6.6 Summary
This section has given an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of TACOMA and
PTACOMA and have shown that the languages have different usages. TACOMA is
an easy to learn language that are well suited for smaller diagrams where the number
of users and entities are small.
For larger networks with multiple administrators or large number of users and
entities, PTACOMA is better suited because of its scalability. The disadvantage of
PTACOMA is its complexity.
Table 6.1 gives a summary of the weaknesses and strong points of each language.
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Chapter 7
Case study: Using PTACOMA to
Model Access Control in a Large
Scale Deployment of Passive
Monitoring Probes
UNINETT, the Norwegian NREN, is currently in the process of deploying a large
number of passive monitoring probes as part of the GigaCampus project[45, 46].
These probes will be deployed both in the backbone network as well as access links to
customers and will be based on technology from the IST project LOBSTER[47]. The
deployment on access links of customers will be based on a cooperation between the
customer and UNINETT and both parties will be able to use the passive monitoring
probe for security, QoS monitoring, general network usage statistics and research.
One challenge in deploying passive monitoring probes in a multi-domain envi-
ronment is privacy and confidentiality issues. With the probes it is possible to look
deep into the payload of packets which makes it important to have full control over
who uses the probes and what they are used for. It must be possible to monitor active
users of the probes to see what they are doing. Customers should be allowed to see
some of this management information, but not necessarily all the information. This
is where PTACOMA comes in as a good method for configuring the access control
of the management system on the monitoring probes.
This chapter provides a detailed description of how PTACOMA can be used in
this scenario.
7.1 Monitoring API
The Monitoring API(MAPI)[48] is the key technology used in the passive monitoring
probes. MAPI was originally implemented as part of the IST project SCAMPI[49]
and then improved in LOBSTER.
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MAPI was designed for making the development of monitoring applications quicker
and easier. With MAPI, application programmers can concentrate on what they want
to monitor without having to know the details of the hardware they use to capture
the network traffic. Applications based on MAPI can run on top of various types of
hardware without any changes and advanced on-board processing capabilities on the
network adapter is automatically utilized whenever possible.
MAPI is centered on the notion of a network flow. A network flow will initially
represent all the packets seen on the network by the network adapter, but functions
can then be applied to the flow to limit the number of packets. These functions can
for example be BPF filter, sampling, string search, packet counter etc. When all
functions have been applied, the application can connect to the flow and start reading
the results.
The following code shows an example of a simple application implemented on
top of MAPI. This application searches for packets that contain an already known
Internet worm. The worm is easy to detect since it always has destination port 1234
and a well known pattern can be found between 100 and 300 bytes into the packet.
1: fd=mapi apply flow(‘‘/dev/dag0’’);
2: mapi apply function(fd,’’BPF FILTER’’,
’’dst port 1234’’);
3: id1=mapi apply function(fd,’’PKT COUNTER’’);
4: mapi apply function(fd,’’STRING SEARCH’’,
‘‘pattern’’,100,300);
5: id2=mapi apply function(fd,’’PKT COUNTER’’);
6: mapi apply function(fd,’’TO FILE’’,
MFF TCPDUMP,
‘‘worm.trace’’);
7: mapi connect(fd);
8: while(1) {
9: mapi read result(fd,id1,&c1);
10: mapi read result(fd,id2,&c2);
11: printf(‘‘BPF match: %llu
String match: %llu\n’’,
c1,c2);
12: sleep(10); }
The first thing this application does is to open a new flow using the device /dev/dag0.
After that several functions are applied to the flow in lines 2-6. First a BPF filter is
added which restricts the packets in the flow to packets that have a destination port
of 1234. A packet counter is then added which is used for counting the number of
packets that pass through the BPF filter. The ID of the packet counter function is
stored in the variable id1 for future reference when the results are being read.
To locate packets that contain the string pattern that identifies the worm, a string
search function is added and a second packet counter function is also added to count
the number of packets that contains the string.
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The last function that is applied stores the packets that has destination port 1234
and contains the string pattern to a file worm.trace using tcpdump format.
When all functions have been applied, the application connects to the flow in
line 7. It is only when the application connects to the flow that packets start being
processed.
The lines 8-12 are used for printing out status about the progress of the applica-
tion. It reads the results from the counters and prints out a line saying how many
packets that has matched the BPF filter and the string search. It then sleeps for 10
seconds before repeating the process.
When implementing an application using MAPI, the processing of packets con-
tinues in the background even if the application sleeps. The only action needed by
the application is to read and present the results to the user.
7.1.1 Distributed MAPI
Distributed MAPI (DiMAPI)[50] is an extension to MAPI that allows an applica-
tion to simultaneously connect to multiple monitoring probes running MAPI. It is
designed so that most applications that uses MAPI can very easily be extended
to support DiMAPI. The main change is in the command mapi create flow and in
mapi read results.
When creating a new MAPI flow it is now possible to not only specify the device
but also the host. It is also possible to specify multiple hosts at one time:
fd=mapi create flow(‘‘host1:/dev/dag0,
host2:eth0’’);
This command will connect to both host1 and host2 to create a new MAPI flow
and all subsequent calls to mapi apply function and mapi read results will be sent to
both hosts. When using multiple hosts at the same time, mapi read results returns an
array of results.
7.1.2 MAPI security mechanisms
MAPI has built in security functions that makes it possible to set up rules specifying
that users have to first apply some specific functions to the MAPI flow before they
are allowed to connect to it. This feature can for example be used for specifying
that users are allowed to connect to all monitoring probes but that they first have
to apply a BPF filter that filters out all traffic except traffic belonging to their own
organization. This makes it possible to do distributed monitoring in a safe way.
7.1.3 SNMP access
To be able to track who is using MAPI and what they are doing, it is necessary to
instrument MAPI so that the necessary information can be retrieved. For each flow
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it should be possible to see who created the flow and which functions were applied
and what arguments were passed to the functions. This way it is possible to keep a
detailed log of what each user is doing.
MAPI already has an SNMP MIB[51] that provides some of this information, so
it is natural to just extend this to provide the missing information. Using an SNMP
MIB is also convenient since NREN’s and customer network administrators are fa-
miliar with the technology and already have software that can be used for monitoring
the MAPI monitoring probes.
SNMPv3 is the only SNMP version that offers strong authentication and is there-
for the version most likely to be used in the scenario described here. The secu-
rity mechanisms in SNMPv3 are divided into two parts: User-based Security Model
(USM) and View-based Access Control Model (VACM).
User-based Security Model (USM)
USM is a security model for SNMP that offers strong security and authentication.
The USM specification[14] also defines a MIB that offers a standardized method for
adding and removing users that are authorized to access an SNMP entity. This is
done by adding and deleting entries in the SNMP MIB table usmUserTable.
View-based Access Control Model (VACM)
VACM is the only access control model defined so far for SNMPv3. VACM[15] is
responsible for deciding if an operation is allowed or not based on the identity of
the user. It assumes that the message has already been authenticated by a security
model like USM. VACM is based on the concept of MIB views. A MIB view is a
subset of the entire MIB available in an SNMP entity and defines which MIB objects
that can be accessed by a certain user. VACM also defines a standardized MIB for
configuring the access control.
To add access rights to a user, three SNMP MIB tables needs modification:
vacmSecurityToGroupTable maps the user name into a group name. A user can
only belong to one group and all users that belong to the same group
have identical access rights.
vacmAccessTable maps the group name and access type1 into a MIB view.
vacmViewTreeFamilyTable defines the MIB view and decided whether an OID in
the MIB tree is accessible or not. The MIB view consists of a list of OIDs
that defines the nodes in the MIB tree that are included or excluded from
the access rights. To grant access to only specific rows in a table, the
index that distinguishes the rows are part of the OID. It is also possible
to use wildcards in the OID. This means that certain numbers in the OID
1Access types in SNMP can be read, write or notify
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is masked out and not considered when deciding if the OID of an request
matches the OIDs specified in the vacmViewTreeFamilyTable.
A more detailed overview of the security mechanisms in SNMPv3 is provided in
Appendix B.
7.2 Management information
The new MAPI SNMP MIB that provides the necessary information will be divided
into into five different groups which in SNMP are all organized into tables.
The full MAPI MIB definition can be found in Appendix F.
7.2.1 Interface
This group provides detailed information about all available interfaces in a probe
that can be used by MAPI. Each entry in the table contains information about one
interface and the index to the table is the value of mapiIfIndex.
mapiIfIndex A unique value, greater that zero, for each device available for monitor-
ing through MAPI.
mapiIfName A textual string containing the name of the interface. The name should
uniquely identify the interface in the monitoring probe. An example of
a name is “eth1”
mapiIfDescr A textual string containing information about the device. The string
should include the name of the manufacturer, the product name and the
version of the device hardware/software.
mapiIfAlias This object is an “alias” name for the interface as specified by a network
manager, and provides a non-volatile “handle” for the interface.
mapiIfType Integer value specifying the type of link layer. Works similar to ifType
described in RFC 1213.
mapiIfStatus The current status of the interface. The status can be: active, ready,
unavailable, linkLost or unknown.
mapiIfPkts The total number of packets captured by the interface.
mapiIfOctets The total number of octets captured by the interface.
mapiIfDroppedPkts The total number of packets dropped by the interface.
mapiIfLastBufferSize The total number of bytes that was last read from the interface.
mapIfCounterDiscontinuityTime The value of sysUpTime on the most recent occa-
sion at which any one or more of this interface’s counters suffered a
discontinuity.
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7.2.2 Organization
This group provides information about all organizations that users who are allowed
access to MAPI belongs to. Each entry in the table contains information about one
organization.
The index to this table is a unique organization ID.
mapiOrgID Unique integer value identifying the organization.
mapiOrgName Name of the organization.
mapiOrgContact Name of contact person at the organization.
mapiOrgContactPhone Phone number for the contact person.
mapiOrgContactEmail Email address for the contact person.
7.2.3 User
Group that contains information about all users allowed to connect to DiMAPI. Each
entry in the table contains information about one user.
The index to this table is the ID of the organization that the user belongs to in
addition to a unique user ID.
mapiOrgID Integer value showing which organization the user belongs to.
mapiUserID Unique integer value identifying the user.
mapiUserName Name of the user.
mapiUserLoginName Login name of the user.
mapiUserLastLogin Date and time of the last time the user was logged in.
mapiUserTotalFlows Total number of MAPI flows the user has created.
mapiUserActiveFlows Number of currently active MAPI flows.
7.2.4 Flow
This group contains a list of all active and recently closed flows. Each entry in the
table contains information about one flow.
The index to this table is the organization ID and user ID of the user who owns
the flow as well as a unique flow ID.
mapiOrgID Integer value showing which organization the flow belongs to.
mapiUserID Integer value identifying the user the flow belongs to.
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mapiFlowID Unique integer value identifying the flow.
mapiFlowIfIndex Integer value showing which interface this flow is running on.
mapiFlowNumFunctions Number of functions applied to the flow.
mapiFlowPkts Number of packets captured by the flow.
mapFlowOctets Number of octets captured by the flow.
mapiFlowDroppedPkts Number of dropped packets that the flow should have cap-
tured.
mapiFlowStart Start time of the flow.
mapiFlowEnd End time of the flow. If the flow is still active this value is 0.
7.2.5 Function
This is a list of the functions applied to active flows. It contains information about the
type of function and the number of packets that have been processed by the function.
Each entry in the table contains information about one function.
The index to this table is the organization ID and user ID of the user who owns
the function, the flow ID the function belongs to and the function ID.
mapiOrgID Integer value showing which organization the function belongs to.
mapiUserID Integer value identifying the user the function belongs to
mapiFlowID integer value identifying the flow the function belongs to.
mapiFunctID Unique integer value identifying the function.
mapiFunctPkts Number of packets captured by the function.
mapiFunctOctets Number of octets captured by the function.
mapiFunctPassedPkts Number of packets that has passed through the function.
mapiFunctDroppedPkts Number of octets that has been dropped by the function.
7.2.6 Argument
This is a list of the arguments that were passed to each function. This information
includes the type of argument and the value. Each entry in the table contains infor-
mation about one argument.
The index to this table is the organization ID and user ID of the user who owns
the function, the function ID the argument belongs to and the argument ID.
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mapiOrgID Integer value showing which organization the argument belongs to.
mapiUserID Integer value showing which user the argument belongs to.
mapiFlowID Integer value showing which flow the argument belongs to.
mapiFunctID Integer value showing which function the argument belongs to.
mapiArgID Integer representing the argument ID. For each function this starts at 1
and increments with 1 for each argument.
mapiArgType String that describes the type of argument, eg. integer, float, string
etc.
mapiArgValue String representation of the value of the argument.
7.3 Using the MAPI MIB
Administrators can use the mapiInterfacesTable to look at the performance of MAPI.
If the counter representing dropped packets on an interface keeps increasing it will
usually indicate that the monitoring probe is overloaded and can not manage to pro-
cess packets fast enough.
Administrators can also use the mapiFlows table together with functions and ar-
guments to get a detailed overview of the active MAPI flows. Combining this in-
formation with information from mapiOrganization and mapiUsers tables makes it
possible to tell exactly who is doing what on the monitoring probe.
Guest users can use the MAPI MIB to check the status of their own flows and to
check for dropped packets on the interfaces.
7.4 Access control requirements
UNINETT administrators should have full access to all information in the MAPI
MIB. Customer administrators should have full access to all information on moni-
toring probes in their own domain, while on remote domains they should only be
able to see information about guest users from their own domain. This requirement
is summarized in table 7.1 where we can see that on remote probes the information
available to the customer administrators is limited to entries in the MAPI MIB that
has the same organization ID as the administrator.
Guest users should only be allowed access to their own flows and information
about available interfaces should be open for everyone. This is summarized in table
7.2
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Object Local probes Remote probes
mapiIfTable * *
mapiOrgTable * ORGID()
mapiUserTable * ORGID().*
mapiFlowTable * ORGID().*
mapiFunctTable * ORGID().*
mapiArgTable * ORGID().*
Table 7.1: MAPI MIB access control for customer administrators
Object All probes
mapiIfTable *
mapiOrgTable ORG().*
mapiUserTable ORG().UID()
mapiFlowTable ORG().UID().*
mapiFunctTable ORG().UID().*
mapiArgTable ORG().UID().*
Table 7.2: MAPI MIB access control for guest users
7.5 SNMPv3 USM and VACM configuration
Based on the requirements for access control described in the previous section several
entries in the USM and VACM tables have to be added.
7.5.1 UNINETT administrator
First of all an entry for the UNINETT administrator has to be added to the us-
mUserTable. This allows the administrator to access the SNMP agent running on
the monitoring probes.
Further entries are needed in the VACM tables before the administrator is allowed
to access any of the MAPI MIB information. To allow full access to the MAPI MIB,
three entries are needed. One in vacmSecurityToGroupTable that maps the security
name of the administrator to an administrator group. Multiple administrators can be
member of this group.
One entry is needed in the vacmAccessTable to specify which view should be
assigned the administrator group and one entry is needed in vacmViewTreeFami-
lyTable to specify that the administrator should have full access the the entire MAPI
MIB.
7.5.2 Guest users
All guest users need an entry in the usmUserTable to be able to connect to the SNMP
agent. They also need one entry each in vacmSecurityToGroupTable and vacmAc-
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cessTable. Since each guest user should only have access to their own flows, it is not
possible to use one common group for all of them.
To specify which information that should be available to a guest user, 6 entries in
vacmViewTreeFamilyTable is needed, one for each table in the MAPI MIB. These
entries should use the organization ID and user ID of each guest user to limit access
to only information belonging to this user.
7.5.3 Customer administrators
Just as for guest users, customer administrators will need their own VACM group
so one entry is needed in usmUserTable, vacmSecurityToGroupTable and vacmAc-
cessTable for each of them.
On remote probes the customer administrators needs 6 entries in vacmViewTreeFam-
ilyTable to provide access to all entries in the MAPI MIB that belongs to the same
organization as the administrator.
On local probes a single entry in vacmViewTreeFamilyTable is needed to provide
full access to the entire MAPI MIB.
7.5.4 Full configuration
Assuming there are 15 monitoring probes with one UNINETT administrator, 15 cus-
tomer administrators and 30 different guest users, the full configuration of USM and
VACM on one of the monitoring probes will result in a total of 4+30∗9+15∗3+
1+14∗6 = 404 entries.
Since the configuration has to be different on all 15 monitoring probes, as much
as 6060 entries are needed. This clearly shows that hand editing the access rules is
not very realistic. It is very easy to loose track of who has access to what and other
methods must be used.
7.6 PTACOMA diagrams
Specifying the access control requirements for this case study using PTACOMA is
relatively simple and straight forward. A minimum of three policies are needed, one
for each user type. It can however be convenient to use two policies for the customer
administrators, one for access on local probes and one for remote probes.
In addition to these policies there would be 15 different domain symbols where
each domain defines the customer administrator as well as an entity representing the
monitoring probe implementing the MAPI MIB.
7.6.1 UNINETT administrators
The policy providing full access to the entire MAPI MIB is shown in figure 7.1. In
this policy we can see that the UNINETT administrator is granted full access to the
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UNINETT
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MAPI
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Figure 7.1: PTACOMA diagram for UNINETT administrators
MAPI MIB for all entities of the type MAPI in all domains.
7.6.2 Guest users
The PTACOMA diagram for the guest users are shown in figure 7.2. Here we can
see one policy that grants access to the group “MAPI access” to all users with the
role “Guest user” . We can also see that the role symbol “Guest user” has an at-
tribute called “mapiIndex” and that this attribute has the value “ORGID().UID()”.
The purpose of this attribute is shown in figure 7.3.
What this figure shows is the contents of the group “MAPI access” and as we
can see this group grants some access to all entities of the type “MAPI”. Full access
is given to mapiIfTable and access to mapiOrgTable is limited to the entry with the
same organization ID as the guest user. Access to the remaining tables in the MAPI
MIB is limited to the entries with index as specified by the attribute “mapiIndex”.
In this case this attribute has been set to “ORGID().UID()” which means that guest
users are only allowed to see information about their own flows and functions.
7.6.3 Customer administrators
Two policies are created for the customer administrators, one for access to local
probes and one for access to remote probes. Access to local probes is very similar to
the policy for UNINETT administrators and is shown in figure 7.4. In this figure we
see that all users in all domains with the role of “Customer admin” is assigned full
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Figure 7.2: PTACOMA diagram for guest users
mapiFunctTable.Attr(mapiIndex)
mapiFlowTable.Attr(mapiIndex)
mapiUserTable.Attr(mapiIndex)
mapiArgTable.Attr(mapiIndex)
mapiIfTable.*
mapiOrgTable.ORG()
MAPI
Figure 7.3: MAPI access group contents
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Figure 7.4: PTACOMA diagram for local access for customer administrators.
access to the MAPI MIB. The difference compared to the UNINETT administrator
is that in this policy full access is only granted to entities of the type “MAPI” in the
users own domain.
The policy for remote access is shown in figure 7.5. This policy is very similar
to the policy for guest users with only two modifications. First of all the attribute
mapiIndex has changed from “ORGID().UID()” to “ORGID()”. This provides ac-
cess to information about all flows and functions belonging to users from the same
organization and not just the customer administrators own flows and functions. This
policy is also only valid for entities in all except the customer administrators own
domain.
7.7 Summary and conclusions
The case study presented in this chapter is relatively simple and only uses a few of
the features available in the PTACOMA language. Even so it clearly demonstrates
how the PTACOMA language can be used for specifying access control in an SNMP
framework.
Hand editing several hundred or even thousands of lines of access control config-
uration is not scalable. One other alternative could have been to create a script that
automatically added and deleted users from the access control for the MAPI MIB.
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Figure 7.5: PTACOMA diagram for remote access for customer administrators
This however has the disadvantage of only working for this specific application. If
access to other SNMP MIBs should be configured, a new script would have to be de-
veloped. All the diagrams shown in this case study uses generic PTACOMA features
that can be used for all SNMP MIBs.
Using a script also locks you to the SNMP technology. In the future it might be
more suitable to move the monitoring of MAPI to other technologies like WSDM[52]
or NETCONF[53]. Both these technologies are XML based and as long as the data
model remains the same, the PTACOMA diagrams would still be valid. All that
would be needed is a new ACL Configurator.
In PTACOMA it is also easy to add exceptions to the standard rules. For example
if one single user should have extended access, it is easy to add without loosing track
of exactly who has access to what.
Since the MAPI MIB described in this chapter has not yet been fully implemented
and UNINETT is still in the deployment phase of the monitoring probes, it has not
been possible to test PTACOMA in this scenario. The PTACOMA prototype that has
been implemented do not support all the features of the PTACOMA language, but
it do support enough to be used in this scenario and this prototype is described in
further details in Appendix C.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and further work
This chapter provides a conclusion of the work presented in this thesis. It also gives
a quick overview of related work and discusses further work that can be done.
8.1 Conclusions
The work presented in this thesis started out as research into finding an easy to use
and highly scalable method for specifying access control in SNMPv3. This work re-
sulted in the language called MIB View Modeling Language (MVML) but it quickly
turned out that the language could be made more generic and work continued to cre-
ate a language that could be used for specifying and configuring access control in
most applications or systems that store information in a tree based structure.
Two separate languages were then created, TACOMA and PTACOMA. TACOMA
is a direct generalization of the original MVML language. It is very easy to learn and
use but is best suited for small to medium sized systems. To be able to cope with
large multi-domain systems, a policy based version of the language, PTACOMA,
was created. While a bit harder to learn and more difficult to fully utilize all the fea-
ture of the language, PTACOMA is able to scale to a large number of users, entities
and large tree based structures.
The original goal was to create a language that was both easy to use and was able
to scale to large systems. It proved difficult to fulfill both these goals in one single
language but the solution of defining two related languages works well. Depend-
ing on the complexity of the task at hand, administrators will be able to chose the
modeling language that best fits their need.
Based on the experience from the implemented prototype1 and detailed studies
of various case studies like the one presented in chapter 7, the two goals of creating
languages that are easy to use and highly scalable seems to have been fully met. The
case study clearly shows that the PTACOMA language is well suited for specifying
access control in SNMPv3 and the same techniques as presented in this case study
1This prototype is described in Appendix C.
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can be used for other emerging network management protocols like NETCONF and
WSDM.
The languages presented in this thesis are also easy to deploy for new types of
applications and systems and can therefor easily be adapted for new use cases. The
only requirement is that they store information in tree-based structures.
8.2 Related work
There are other modeling languages available like SecureUML[54] and UMLsec[55].
These are however not modeling languages for specifying and configuring access
control. They are instead UML extensions to model secure applications during de-
velopment.
There are also several generic languages available for specifying policies[42].
Most of these languages like Role Definition Language(RDL)[56], RSL99[57], Au-
thorization Specification Language(ASL)[58] and RBAC are all text based languages
and are either aimed at more high level policy specification or like RBAC need spe-
cific support for the language in the systems that want to use it. With TACOMA and
PTACOMA no modification to existing systems are needed.
LaSCO[59] is a graphical language for specifying security constraints on objects.
It focuses on more high level policies compared to PTACOMA and because of this
it is not always trivial to map the policies to the lower level systems unless it is
implemented with a LaSCO policy enforcement framework.
8.3 Further work
So far the prototype implementation of PTACOMA only implements a subset of
the features available in the language. A full implementation is needed to get more
practical experience with the language to see if any modifications are needed.
More work is also needed on the ACL Optimizer to optimize the number of access
control rules that must be configured in managed entities. Especially with dynamic
tree structures complex algorithms are needed to find the most optimized set of rules.
Further research into combining PTACOMA with XACML should also be done.
XACML is designed as a general purpose language that is very versatile and can be
used for specifying access control rules in virtually all systems. While PTACOMA
will never be an all purpose language as it is specially designed for systems storing
information in tree-based structures, it still has a big potential as a graphical language
for creating XACML policies for these types of systems.
The main improvement of PTACOMA for better support for XACML is in the
constraints. In the current version of PTACOMA, the constraint symbol is completely
generic without any restrictions. All the specification says is that the symbol can
contain various attributes that specify some kind of constraint. The exact syntax
of these constraints depends on the application or system being configured. If the
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Figure 8.1: XACML constraints in PTACOMA
targeted system is XACML, further restrictions can be put on the constraint symbol
so that it better fits the model used in XACML.
In XACML a policy can specify resources that should be checked for specific
values while the policy is being evaluated. This can for example be the load of the
system, the number of already logged on users etc. XACML defines a strict syntax
for specifying this. With the current constraint symbol in PTACOMA, the XACML
syntax for specifying these constraints can be added as an argument to the symbol. It
might be better however to use the current mechanisms in PTACOMA for specifying
nodes in the tree structure to graphically represents these XACML constraints.
One possible solution to this is shown in figure 8.1. In this figure we see a simple
policy granting users with the role R1 access to node 1.4 in entity E1. We can also
see a constraint symbol with an new constraint function symbol as a child. This
constraint function is a “less than” function. We can also see that this function symbol
further has a child symbol which is the node 1.5. What this means is that this policy
is only valid if the value of node 1.5 is less than a certain value as specified by an
attribute to the “less than” function.
Further work is needed to see how these technique can be used to fully cover the
possibilities in XACML and still be easy to use.
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One other feature of XACML that can be added to PTACOMA is dependency be-
tween policies. XACML defines a language for specifying decentralized distributed
rules that can be part of multiple policies. The language specifies how these rules
can be combined to give one single result. In large distributed systems this is an
important feature that should be added to PTACOMA.
Appendix A
Lis of Acronyms
ACL Access Control List
API Application Programming Interface
BER Basic Encoding Rules
CMIP Common Management Information Protocol
DAC Discretionary Access Control
DOM Document Object Model
E-R Entity-Relationship
HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
INCITS InterNational Commettee for Information Technology Standards
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
MAC Mandatory Access Control
MAPI Monitoring Application Programming Interface
MIB Management Information Base
MVML MIB View Modeling Language
OASIS Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
PHP PHP Hypertext Preprocessor
PMVML Policy-based MIB View Modeling Language
PTACOMA Policy-based Tree-based Access control Modeling Language
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service
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RBAC Role-Based Access Control
SAC SNMP ACL Configurator
SAX Simple API for XML
SDL Specification and Description Language
SMI Structure of Management Information
SMP Simple Management Protocol
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
TACACS Terminal Access Controller Access Control System
TACOMA Tree-based Access control Modeling Language
TCSEC Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
UML Unified Modeling Language
WSDM Web Services Distributed Management
XACML Extensible Access Control Markup Language
XMI XML metadata interchange
XML Extensible Markup Language
XSL Extensible Stylesheet Language
XSLT XSL Transformations
Appendix B
Simple Network Management
Protocol
The Simple Network Management Protocol(SNMP) is the most commonly used pro-
tocol for network management in TCP/IP networks. It was developed to be a simple
protocol that should be easy to implement even on entities with limited resources.
B.1 History
The first version of SNMP was released as a proposed standard in April 1989 and
a full standard in May 1990. The release of SNMP was only meant as a temporary
solution as it was expected that CMIP1 over TCP/IP would eventually take over.
It was quickly realized that the first version of SNMP had several shortcomings,
especially with security and management of large networks. In early 1992 two pro-
posals for a new SNMP version was given, Secure SNMP and Simple Management
Protocol (SMP).
In May 1993 the best from both these proposals were taken and combined into
SNMPv2. Compared to the first version, SNMPv2 had several improvements:
• security
• manager-to-manager communication
• support for more transport-services
• more effective collection of large amount of data
Unfortunately if turned out that the security mechanisms were too complex and in
1995 the security functions were removed and SNMPv2c was released which kept the
same weak security as in the first version. This led to much confusion and SNMPv2
was never widely deployed.
1Common Management Information Protocol, ISO standard for network management
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Figure B.1: SNMP framework
In March 1998 SNMPv3 was first introduced. SNMPv3 has all the other im-
provements of SNMPv2 and also adds strong security and access control. In 2002
SNMPv3 became a full IETF standard.
B.2 Framework
Figure B.1 shows the basic framework of SNMP. A management system in SNMP
consists of several nodes which traditionally has been called agents, at least one
management station and a protocol used to exchange information. SNMPv3 uses a
new terminology and calls both agents and managements stations for entities.
Inside managed entities there is a virtual collection of management information
called a Management Information Base (MIB). The description of the structure of a
MIB is written using a notation called Structure of Management Information (SMI).
Information is transported between managed and manager entities using the SNMP
management protocol.
B.2.1 Management Information Base
The term MIB can have different meaning depending on the context. It can be the
collection of all management information in an entity, but it can also mean the doc-
ument that describes a specific part of the management information. For example,
people can talk about the entity MIB or the printer MIB and so on.
B.2.2 Structure of Management Information
The Structure of Management Information (SMI) is a language used for defining
managed objects that can be manipulated using the SNMP protocol. It is based on
a subset of ASN.1 and was design with two main goals in mind: simplicity and
extensibility.
Every managed object accessible through SNMP has a name, a syntax and an
encoding. SMI is used to define the names and syntax of these managed objects.
Encoding of managed objects is done using standard BER[60] encoding.
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Figure B.2: SNMPv3 reference model
Names
To be able to identify managed objects, all objects have to have a unique name within
a MIB. SMI uses the OBJECT IDENTIFIER2, a sequence of integers which traverse
a global tree. A leaf in this tree represents a single managed object and a node with
children represents a collection of managed objects.
B.3 SNMPv3 reference model
One of the goals of SNMPv3 was to make it possible to change and improve parts of
the standard without having to redesign all the components. This was accomplished
by using a modular design. Figure B.2 shows the building blocks of an SNMPv3
entity which is also the reference model used by the SNMPv3 standard. An SNMP
entity always consists of an SNMP engine and one or more applications. The SNMP
engine takes care of all the low level message handling routines needed for sending
and receiving messages, including security functions. The applications are internal
applications within the SNMP entity. They are responsible for generating SNMP
messages and respond to received messages.
2Often called an OID
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B.4 User-based Security Model
The User-based Security Model (USM) is a security model for SNMP that offers
strong security and authentication. The USM specifications also defines a MIB that
offers a standardized method for adding and removing users that are authorized to
access an SNMP entity.
USM is organized into three distinct modules that each is responsible for different
security services:
Timeliness Provides limited protection against message delay and replay. Since
SNMP traffic usually goes over unreliable and connectionless transport
services like UDP, message stream modifications is a natural occurrence.
This module gives protection against modifications that are defined as
greater than the normal occurrences.
Authentication Provides services for data integrity and data origin authentication.
Data integrity prevents third parties from changing any information in an
SNMP packet and data origin authentication prevents a third party from
assuming the identity of a trusted user who is authorized to connect to
an SNMP entity.
Privacy prevents third parties from eavesdropping on messages sent between two
SNMP entities.
The USM MIB provides a standardized way of managing the users that are allowed
to access an SNMP entity. The initial user has to be created through some other
method than SNMP. Usually this is done using a console. After the initial user has
been created new users can be added and passwords changed through SNMP SET
requests. Figure B.3 shows the structure of the USM MIB.
The usmStats table in the USM MIB contains counters that represents different
errors that has occurred since the last time the SNMP engine was restarted. The
usmUser table is the table that controls who has access to the SNMP engine and the
usmUserSpinLock entry is used as a semaphore to prevent more than one manager
changing the secret keys at the same time.
B.4.1 usmUserTable
This table contains information about all users who are authorized to access the
SNMP entity.
usmUserEngineID In simple entities this is the ID of that SNMP entity’s SNMP
engine.
usmUserName Name of user in human readable form.
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snmpUsmMIB
(snmpModules 15)
usmMIBObjects
(snmpUsmMIB 1)
usmMIBConformance
(snmpUsmMIB 2)
usmStatsUnsupportedSecLevels
(usmStats 1)
usmStatsNotInTimeWindows
(usmStats 2)
usmStatsUnknownUserName
(usmStats 3)
usmStatsUnknownEngineIDs
(usmStats 4)
usmStatsWrongDigests
(usmStats 5)
usmStatsDecryptionErrors
(usmStats 1)
usmStats
(usmMIBObjects 1)
usmUserSpinLock
(usmUser 1)
usmUserTable
(usmUser 2)
usmUserEntry
(usmUserTable 1)
usmUserEngineID
(usmUserEntry 1)
usmUserName
(usmUserEntry 2)
usmUserSecurityName
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usmUserSecurityName Name of user in Security Model independent format. Usu-
ally the same as usmUserName.
usmUserCloneFrom All new users must be cloned from an existing user and this is a
pointer to another row in the usmUserTable which contains the original
user.
usmUserAuthProtocol Indicates which authentication protocol that may be used.
usmUserAuthKeyChange Used for changing the secret authentication key of a user.
usmUserOwnAuthKeyChange Same function as above but can only be used to change
the authentication key of the user who was authenticated.
usmUserPrivProtocol Indicates which privacy protocol that may be used.
usmUserPrivKeyChange Used for changing the secret privacy key of a user.
usmUserOwnPrivKeyChange Same function as above but can only be used to change
the privacy key of the user who was authenticated.
usmUserPublic Used for verifying that a key change was successful.
usmUserStorageType Storage type of the row.
usmUserStatus Status of the row.
B.4.2 Adding users
When the initial user has been created, additional user can be added by cloning an
existing user. The procedure for adding a new user is as follows:
• Create a new row in usmUserTable by cloning it from the value specified in
usmUserCloneFrom and setting usmUserStatus to createAndWait. Check for
errors.
• Check usmUserSpinLock. If set, wait till it becomes available.
• Set usmUserSpinLock.
• Configure authentication and privacy.
• Clear usmUserSpinLock.
• Set usmUserStatus to active.
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B.4.3 Deleting users
To delete a user the value destroy is inserted into the usmUserStatus field belonging to
the conceptual row in usmUserTable of the user that is being deleted. This procedure
follows the recommendations of RFC 2579[61].
B.4.4 Changing keys
Changing keys are done by using SNMP SET commands to write to the usmAu-
thKeyChange, usmOwnAuthKeyChange, usmPrivKeyChange or usmOwnPrivKey-
Change. The reason why there are two different attributes that can be used for chang-
ing authentication and privacy keys has to do with how the View-based Access Con-
trol Model works. Administrators who have write access to the entire usmUserTable
can use usmAuthKeyChange and usmPrivKeyChange to change the secret keys of
all users. The problem is how to allow all users to change their own passwords. If
usmAuthKeyChange and usmPrivKeyChange were used, the access control system
would have to be updated for each new user so that he could only modify his own
keys. To avoid this usmOwnAuthKeyChange and usmOwnPrivKeyChange were in-
troduced. These two attributes can be made writable by everyone since it by defini-
tion can only be used to change the users own keys.
When changing keys the usmUserSpinLock should be used to avoid conflicts
between multiple managers accessing usmUserTable at the same time.
B.5 View-based Access Control Model
The View-based Access Control Model (VACM) is the only access control model
defined so far for SNMPv3. It is responsible for deciding if an operation is allowed
or not based on the identity of the user. It assumes that the message has already been
authenticated by a security model like USM.
VACM is based on the concept of MIB views. A MIB view is a subset of the
entire MIB available in an SNMP entity and defines which MIB objects that can be
accessed by a certain user. MIB views are assigned to groups which in turn users are
assign to. There are also different views for GET, SET and NOTIFY operations.
It is possible to configure the access control mechanisms through the VACM
MIB. Its structure is shown in figure B.4. In this MIB there are four tables that are
used to decide the access control rights:
• vacmContextTable. A read only table that defines the locally available con-
texts.
• vacmSecurityToGroupTable. Maps the combination of a securityName and
securityModel into a groupName.
• vacmAccessTable. The combination of groupName, context and security in-
formation is mapped into a MIB view.
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• vacmViewTreeFamilyTable. Defines the MIB view and decides if an OID is
accessible or not.
Figure B.5 shows the process of deciding if access is allowed. The process is as
follows:
1. securityName and securityModel defines who wants access. This information
is used to access the vacmSecurityToGroupTable to get the group that the user
belongs to.
2. contextName represents where access is wanted, securityModel and securityLevel
specifies how access is being done and viewType says why access is wanted.
This information is used to access vacmAccessTable to get the name of the
SNMP view.
3. object-type, what, and object-instance, which, taken together forms the OID
that is being accessed. This is used as index to the vacmViewTreeFamilyTable
and a decision is reached whether access is allowed or not.
B.5.1 vacmSecurityToGroupTable
vacmSecurityModel security model used
vacmSecurityName security name that is security model independent
vacmGroupName name of group this entry belongs to
vacmSecurityToGroupStorageType storage type of the row
vacmSecurityToGroupStatus status of the row
B.5.2 vacmAccessTable
vacmAccessContextPrefix name of collection of management information
vacmAccessSecurityModel security model used
vacmAccessSecurityLevel security level used
vacmAccessContextMatch specifies how vacmAccessContextPrefix should be matched,
exact or prefix.
vacmAccessReadViewName name of read view
vacmAccessWriteViewName name of write view
vacmAccessNotidyViewName name of notify view
vacmAccessStorageType storage type of the row
vacmAccessStatus status of the row
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vacmSecurity-
ToGroupTable
vacmAccessTable
vacmViewTreeFamilyTable
securityName
securityModel
securityLevel
contextName
viewType
object-type
object-instance
groupName
viewName
yes/no
1. who
2. where
3. how
4. why
5. what
6. which
securityModel
Figure B.5: VACM access control process
B.5.3 vacmViewTreeFamilyTable
vacmViewTreeFamilyViewName name for a family of subtrees that form a view.
vacmViewTreeFamilySubtree an OID that points to a portion of the MIB tree.
vacmViewTreeFamilyMask used to control which elements of the vacmViewTreeFam-
ilySubtree should be regarded as relevant when determining which view
an OID is in. Each bit in the mask corresponds to an element in the OID.
A 1 indicates exact match and a 0 indicates a wild card.
vacmViewTreeFamilyType type of view. Can be include or exclude.
vacmViewTreeFamilyStorageType storage type of the row
vacmViewTreeFamilyStatus status of the row
B.5.4 Creating MIB views
MIB views are created by populating the vacmViewTreeFamilyTable. This table
contains a list of object identifiers that are either included or excluded from the view.
Object identifiers in this table specifies subtrees in the MIB. This means that all object
identifiers that belong to this subtree are included or excluded.
vacmViewTreeFamilyMask is used to introduce wildcards in the specified object
identifier. This is mostly used to include one specific row in a table.
Imagine a MIB, mibA, that has a table, tableA, with three columns, tableAcol1,
tableAcol2 and tableAcol3. The column tableAcol1 is used as index. Table B.1
shows the Object identifiers used in mibA.
Now assume that a user, User1, is given access to the row where tableAcol1 =
2. This means that User1 should be given access to the following Object Identi-
fiers: 1.2.3.4.5.1.y.2 y∈ {2,3}. Table B.2 shows how this entry would look in the
vacmViewTreeFamilyTable if the name of the view was view1.
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Name Object identifier
mibA 1.2.3.4
tableA 1.2.3.4.5
tableAentry 1.2.3.4.5.1
tableAcol1 1.2.3.4.5.1.1
tableAcol2 1.2.3.4.5.1.2
tableAcol3 1.2.3.4.5.1.3
Table B.1: Object identifiers for mibA
Object Value
vacmViewTreeFamilyViewName view1
vacmViewTreeFamilySubtree 1.2.3.4.5.1.0.2
vacmViewTreeFamilyMask 11111101
vacmViewTreeFamilyType 1
Table B.2: vacmViewTreeFamilyTable entries
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Appendix C
Prototype implementation of
TACOMA and PTACOMA for
configuring SNMPv3 access control
This chapter describes a prototype implementation of both TACOMA and PTA-
COMA that was used for configuring SNMPv3 entities. It starts by describing some
key technologies used by the implementation, gives an overview of the design and
details about how it was implemented.
C.1 Introduction
The main purpose of implementing a prototype of the TACOMA and PTACOMA
languages was to verify that the specifications of the languages are correct and do not
have any weaknesses. The implementation should therefore be considered as proof
of concept and not a fully developed application that can be used for configuring
access control in devices.
The prototype for TACOMA has support for most of the specification of the lan-
guage but it do attempt to do any optimization at all of the number of access control
rules that must be configured. The PTACOMA prototype only implements a subset
of the language. Even if not everything is implemented, there is enough support for
features of the language to achieve a high confidence in that the language specifica-
tion is correct.
It was desirable to implement a prototype as quickly as possible and since perfor-
mance was not an issue, PHP was chosen as the implementation language as it has
good support for XML.
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C.1.1 DOM and SAX
The Document Object Model (DOM) and Simple API for XML (SAX) are two dif-
ferent APIs both designed to provide programmers easy access to the information
stored in XML documents. While they both have the same goal, they use two very
different approaches to achieving this goal.
DOM is the most advanced API and gives the programmer access to the whole
XML document through a hierarchical object model. What this means is that DOM
reads an entire XML document and creates a tree of objects that follows the structure
of the document. The programmer can then interact with these objects to get hold of
the information.
The advantage of DOM is that it takes care of creating an object model of the
XML document. As long as it is natural to use an object model like this in an ap-
plication, DOM is easy to use. The problem is that for many applications, the tree
based object model of DOM is not the most useful one. When an application wants
to use its own object model, it is usually better to use SAX.
As the name applies, SAX is a simple API for accessing information stored in
XML documents. It does not create any object model automatically so the program
must do that manually. The advantages of SAX is that it is faster since it do not have
to read all of the XML document before processing elements, and the programmer
has complete freedom to create his own object model.
What SAX provides is an interface that creates a series of events based on the
XML document being parsed. Events are for example created when the beginning
and end of a new XML tag is encountered or for the text between the two tags. The
programmer has to implement a handler for these events and this handler can then
create the object model as it sees fit.
For the TACOMA and PTACOMA parsers implemented here, DOM was used
together with an XPath library for searching the DOM tree.
C.2 TACOMA Parser
The implementation described here is an implementation of a generic TACOMA
Parser that parses a TACOMA XML document and outputs a list of access control
rules. These rules can then be used by a TACOMA SNMP ACL Configurator to
configure SNMP entities. The overall design of the TACOMA Parser is shown in
figure C.1.
The main class is tacoma which is called from the command line and takes the
TACOMA XML file as an argument. The first thing the tacoma class does is to parse
the TACOMA XML file using the built in DOM parser in PHP and then uses an
XPath library to go find all symbols defined in the allSymbols tag in the TACOMA
XML file.
For each of the symbols a new class like User, Entity, Children, Node, Subtree,
TableRow or Group is created. These classes then represents all the available symbols
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Figure C.1: TACOMA Parser design
in the TACOMA diagram. The next step is to find a list of all main diagrams in the
XML document and for each diagram a new MainDiagram class is created. This
class takes as an argument the list of all classes representing the symbols in the
document. When the class is created it will find all relations belonging to this specific
diagram.
For each MainDiagram class, the method getAccessRules is called which returns
all the access rules for this diagram.
C.2.1 getAccessRules
The getAccessRules is where all the work of finding the access control rules is
done. This method is implemented by most classes and works recursively. The
main tacoma class simply calls getAccessRules on each MainDiagram class. The
MainDiagram class will in turn look for all users belonging to this diagram and call
getAccessRules for each user.
The getAccessRules method on symbol classes takes as an argument all relations
belonging to the diagram. So when this method is called on a User class, this class
will find all relations that goes from this symbol to other symbols to find all the
children symbols. It will then call getAccessRules on each of these symbols.
This will continue in a recursive manner until one of the symbols node, children,
subtree or tableRow is reached. These symbols can not have any children so what
they do when getAccessRules is called is to create a new AccessRule class to repre-
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sent the access rule of this symbol. An Entity class will loop through all AccessRules
classes created by children symbols and add itself as the entity the access rules apply
for.
C.3 Configuring SNMP access control
For each main diagram in the TACOMA XML document, the access control rules
will be printed to standard output. This is then read by the SNMP ACL Config-
urator (SAC) which configures the SNMP access control in all entities. SAC first
loops through all users and creates a series of SNMP set commands that creates the
necessary entries in the USM MIB.
For each user the SNMP set commands are then generated to create the necessary
entries in the VACM MIB tables. This is a simple prototype implemented as proof
of concept and contains no optimization. So even if two users have the same access
control rights, two different groups are created in the VACM MIB.
C.4 Limitations
The implementation of the TACOMA Parser supports most features of the language.
The main feature missing is support for EOID functions. It is EOID functions that
makes it possible to create more generic access control rules.
The SNMP ACL Configurator also has some limitations. Wildcards are not im-
plemented which means that the table row symbol is not supported. The child symbol
is also not supported as this requires SAC to be able to read SNMP MIB definitions
to find the children of a specific OID.
C.5 PTACOMA implementation
The PTACOMA Parser implementation follows the same design principals as the
TACOMA Parser implementation and is therefor not described in detail here. The
PTACOMA implementation only implements a subset of the PTACOMA language.
The only functions it supports inside an EOID is the attr() function which allows
attributes set to roles or users to be inserted in the EOID at configuration time. In
addition to this there is no support for domain modeling or policy views.
Enough features are however implemented so that it is possible to use the proto-
type in a scenario as described in Chapter 7. This can be demonstrated by a trivial
example using the standard ifTable from the Interface MIB[62].
In this example we have two domains, D1 and D2, which both has one user, U1
and U2, and one domain, E1 and E2. Both users are assigned role R1 and the entities
are of type T 1. This is shown in figure C.2 and C.3.
We then create two policies, one that defines local access for entities in the users
own domain and one for remote access for entities in other domains. For local access
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ifIndex=1
Figure C.2: Domain D1
U2
R1
E2
T1
ifIndex=2
Figure C.3: Domain D2
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ifTable.attr(ifIndex)
Remote accessLocal access
AllExceptOwn
D2D1
Own
ifTable
T1
T1
R1 R1
<<s>><<s>>
Figure C.4: ifTable policy
we grant full access to the ifTable while on remote entities only access to entries
with ifIndex defined by the user attribute i f Index is granted. These two policies are
shown in figure C.4.
To verify that this works as expected we use the PTACOMA prototype to config-
ure the access control in the two entities. We start off with an empty access control
configuration in the two entities:
$ snmpwalk -v3 -uu1 -l authNoPriv -a MD5 -A 12341234 e1 ifTable
IF-MIB::ifTable = No more variables left in this MIB View
(It is past the end of the MIB tree)
$ snmpwalk -v3 -uu1 -l authNoPriv -a MD5 -A 12341234 e2 ifTable
IF-MIB::ifTable = No more variables left in this MIB View
(It is past the end of the MIB tree)
What these two commands do, is to use snmpwalk to list all entries in ifTable first
for entity E1 and then E2 for user U1. As we can see from the output, user U1 is not
allowed to see any entries in the table so the returned list of values is empty.
We can now run the PTACOMA PHP script for configuring the access control in
the two entities based on the two policies that we showed in figure C.4.
This script parses the PTACOMA diagrams, calculates the access control rules
for each entity and then connect to the entities and configures the access control
through a series of SNMP set messages to configure the VACM MIB:
$ ptacoma.php iftable.xml
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Paring XML document:
New symbol: Local access
New symbol: R1
New symbol: Own
New symbol: T1
New symbol: ifTable
New symbol: Remote access
New symbol: AllExceptOwn
New symbol: ifTable.attr(ifIndex)
New symbol: D1
New symbol: D2
New symbol: U1
New symbol: R1
New symbol: E1
New symbol: T1
New symbol: U2
New symbol: E2
Configuring entity: E1
User U1
User U2
Configuring entity: E2
User U1
User U2
After the script has finished we can check that user U1 now sees two interfaces in the
ifTable on the local entity:
$ snmpwalk -v3 -uu1 -l authNoPriv -a MD5 -A 12341234 e1 ifDescr
IF-MIB::ifDescr.1 = STRING: lo
IF-MIB::ifDescr.2 = STRING: eth0
On the remote entity, only information about the interface with ifIndex 1 is shown:
$ snmpwalk -v3 -uu1 -l authNoPriv -a MD5 -A 12341234 e2 ifDescr
IF-MIB::ifDescr.1 = STRING: lo
User U2 has full access to the local entity E2 while on E1 only information about
interface with ifIndex 2 is shown:
$ snmpwalk -v3 -uu2 -l authNoPriv -a MD5 -A 12341234 e1 ifDescr
IF-MIB::ifDescr.2 = STRING: eth0
$ snmpwalk -v3 -uu2 -l authNoPriv -a MD5 -A 12341234 e2 ifDescr
IF-MIB::ifDescr.1 = STRING: lo
IF-MIB::ifDescr.2 = STRING: eth0
C.6 Conclusions
The implementation of these prototypes, while not complete and with some short-
comings, still proves that the TACOMA and PTACOMA languages can be used for
configuring access control. The prototypes also clearly demonstrates the usefulness
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of having a generic TACOMA and PTACOMA parser that can both generate stan-
dard access control rules that are passed to the SNMP ACL Configurator. This de-
sign made it possible to use the SNMP ACL Configurator for both TACOMA and
PTACOMA without any changes.
While the prototype only supports SNMP, it should be easy and straightforward
to add support for other applications like LDAP or XML based applications.
Appendix D
TACOMA XML Schema
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<schema targetNamespace="http://www.oslebo.com/thesis/tacoma"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:tacoma="http://www.oslebo.com/thesis/tacoma">
<annotation>
<documentation xml:lang="en"> Tree-based Access Control Modeling Language
schema. 2006 Arne Oslebo </documentation>
</annotation>
<element name="tacoma">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="tacoma:allSymbols" minOccurs=’1’ maxOccurs=’
1’/>
<element ref="tacoma:mainDiagram" minOccurs=’1’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
<element ref="tacoma:groupDiagram" minOccurs=’0’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="version" type="string" fixed="1.0" use="required"
/>
</complexType>
<unique name="securityname">
<selector xpath=".//tacoma:user/tacoma:securityName"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</unique>
<key name="symbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//tacoma:user|.//tacoma:entity|.//tacoma:groupWith
outDiagram|.//tacoma:groupWithDiagram|.//tacoma:children|.//tacoma:node|.//tacoma:subtree|
.//tacoma:tableRow"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="symbolKeyRef" refer="tacoma:symbolKey">
<selector xpath=".//tacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="includeFromKey">
<selector
xpath=".//tacoma:groupWithoutDiagram|.//tacoma:user|.//tac
oma:entity"/>
<field xpath="./@id"/>
</key>
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<keyref name="includeFromKeyRef" refer="tacoma:includeFromKey">
<selector xpath=".//tacoma:include/tacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="excludeFromKey">
<selector
xpath=".//tacoma:groupWithoutDiagram|.//tacoma:user"/>
<field xpath="./@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="excludeFromKeyRef" refer="tacoma:excludeFromKey">
<selector xpath=".//tacoma:exclude/tacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<keyref name="toKeyRef" refer="tacoma:symbolKey">
<selector xpath=".//tacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="groupDiagramKey">
<selector xpath=".//tacoma:groupDiagram"/>
<field xpath="./@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="groupDiagramKeyRef" refer="tacoma:groupDiagramKey">
<selector xpath=".//tacoma:group"/>
<field xpath="./tacoma:diagram"/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="groupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="tacoma:symbols" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/
>
<element ref="tacoma:relations" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1
"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="mainDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="tacoma:accessType" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="
1"/>
<element ref="tacoma:name" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="tacoma:symbols" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/
>
<element ref="tacoma:relations" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1
"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="relations">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="tacoma:relationGroup" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
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<group name="relationGroup">
<choice>
<element ref="tacoma:include"/>
<element ref="tacoma:exclude"/>
</choice>
</group>
<element name="include">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="tacoma:from" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="tacoma:to" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="exclude">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="tacoma:from" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="tacoma:to" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="symbols">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="tacoma:symbol" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbo
unded"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="symbol">
<complexType>
<attribute name="ref" type="IDREF"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="allSymbols">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="tacoma:symbolGroup" minOccurs=’1’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<group name="symbolGroup">
<choice>
<element ref="tacoma:children"/>
<element ref="tacoma:entity"/>
<element ref="tacoma:groupWithoutDiagram"/>
<element ref="tacoma:groupWithDiagram"/>
<element ref="tacoma:node"/>
<element ref="tacoma:subtree"/>
<element ref="tacoma:tableRow"/>
<element ref="tacoma:user"/>
</choice>
</group>
<element name="children">
<complexType>
<sequence>
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<group ref="tacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="tacoma:eoid"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="entity">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="tacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="tacoma:address"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="groupWithoutDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="tacoma:commonAttributes"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="groupWithDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="tacoma:commonAttributes"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="diagram" type="IDREF" use="required"/>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="node">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="tacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="tacoma:eoid"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="subtree">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="tacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="tacoma:eoid"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="tableRow">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="tacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="tacoma:eoid"/>
<element ref="tacoma:index"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
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<element name="user">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="tacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="tacoma:securityName" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<group name="commonAttributes">
<sequence>
<element ref="tacoma:name" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="tacoma:description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="tacoma:attr" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="eoid" type="string"/>
<element name="index" type="string"/>
<element name="address" type="string"/>
<element name="diagram" type="IDREF"/>
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
<element name="name" type="string"/>
<element name="description" type="string"/>
<element name="accessType" type="string"/>
<element name="delimiter" type="tacoma:char"/>
<element name="wildcard" type="tacoma:char"/>
<element name="escape" type="tacoma:char"/>
<element name="from" type="IDREF"/>
<element name="to" type="IDREF"/>
<simpleType name="char">
<restriction base="string">
<length value="1"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string" use="required
"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="securityName">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="password" type="string" use="opti
onal"/>
<attribute name="certificate" type="string" use="o
ptional"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
</schema>
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Appendix E
PTACOMA XML Schema
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<schema targetNamespace="http://www.oslebo.com/thesis/ptacoma"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
xmlns:ptacoma="http://www.oslebo.com/thesis/ptacoma">
<annotation>
<documentation xml:lang="en"> Policy Tree-based Access Control Modeling
Language schema. 2006 Arne Oslebo </documentation>
</annotation>
<element name="ptacoma">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:allSymbols" minOccurs=’1’ maxOccurs=’1’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:mainDiagram" minOccurs=’1’ maxOccurs=’1’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:mainGroupDiagram" minOccurs=’0’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:roleDefGroupDiagram" minOccurs=’0’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:subjectsGroupDiagram" minOccurs=’0’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:policyViewDefGroupDiagram" minOccurs=’0’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:targetsGroupDiagram" minOccurs=’0’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:constraintsGroupDiagram" minOccurs=’0’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:typeDefGroupDiagram" minOccurs=’0’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:usersAndDomainsGroupDiagram" minOccurs=’0’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:entitiesAndDomainsGroupDiagram"
minOccurs=’0’ maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:domainModDefGroupDiagram" minOccurs=’0’
maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
<element ref="ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomainsGroupDiagram"
minOccurs=’0’ maxOccurs=’unbounded’/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="version" type="string" fixed="1.0" use="required"/>
</complexType>
<unique name="securityname">
<selector xpath=".//ptacoma:user/ptacoma:securityName"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</unique>
<key name="mainDiagramSymbolKey">
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<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:domain|.//ptacoma:mainGroupDiagram|.//ptacoma:groupWODia
gram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="mainDiagramSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:mainDiagramSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:mainDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//ptacoma:ma
inGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="mainDiagramFromSymbolKey">
<selector xpath=".//ptacoma:groupWODiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="mainDiagramFromSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:mainDiagramFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:mainDiagram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:fr
om|.//ptacoma:mainDiagram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:mainGr
oupDiagram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:mainGroupDiagram/ptac
oma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="roleDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:role|.//ptacoma:roleDefGroupDiagram|.//ptacoma:groupWODi
agram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="roleDefSymbolKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:roleDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:roleDef/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//ptacoma:roleDe
fGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="roleDefFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:groupWODiagram|.//ptacoma:user|.//ptacoma:usersAndDomain
sGroupDiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="roleDefFromSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:roleDefFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:roleDef/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.
//ptacoma:roleDef/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:roleDefDiagram
/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:roleDefDiagram/ptacoma:relation
s/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="policyDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:policy|.//ptacoma:policyDefGroupDiagram|.//ptacoma:group
WODiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="policyDefSymbolKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:policyDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:policyDef/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//ptacoma:poli
cyDefGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
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<key name="SDPolicyDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:policy|.//ptacoma:SDPolicyDefGroupDiagram|.//ptacoma:gro
upWODiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="SDPolicyDefSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:SDPolicyDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:SDPolicyDef/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//ptacoma:SD
PolicyDefGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="subjectsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:role|.//ptacoma:subjectsGroupDiagram|.//ptacoma:groupWOD
iagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="subjectsSymbolKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:subjectsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:subjects/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//ptacoma:subje
ctsGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="subjectsFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:groupWODiagram|.//ptacoma:role|.//ptacoma:domainModDefDi
agram|.//ptacoma:domain"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="subjectsFromSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:subjectsFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:subjects/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|
.//ptacoma:subjects/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:subjectsDiag
ram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:subjectsDiagram/ptacoma:rela
tions/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="policyViewDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:children|.//ptacoma:node|.//ptacoma:subtree|.//ptacoma:t
ableRow|.//ptacoma:policyViewDefGroupDiagram|.//ptacoma:groupWODiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="policyViewDefSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:policyViewDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:policyViewDef/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//ptacoma:
policyViewDefGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="policyViewDefFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:groupWODiagram|.//ptacoma:type|.//ptacoma:typesEntitiesD
omainsDiagram|.//ptacoma:domain|.//ptacoma:entity"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="policyViewDefFromSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:policyViewDefFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:policyViewDef/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:
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from|.//ptacoma:policyViewDef/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:po
licyViewDefDiagram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:policyViewDef
Diagram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="targetsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:children|.//ptacoma:type|.//ptacoma:policyView|.//ptacom
a:entity|.//ptacoma:node|.//ptacoma:subtree|.//ptacoma:tableRow|.//ptacoma:targetsGroupDia
gram|.//ptacoma:groupWODiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="targetsSymbolKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:targetsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:targets/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//ptacoma:target
sGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="targetsFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:groupWODiagram|.//ptacoma:type|.//ptacoma:domainModDiagr
am|.//ptacoma:domain|.//ptacoma:entity"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="targetsFromSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:targetsFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:targets/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.
//ptacoma:targets/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:targetsDiagram
/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:targets/ptacoma:relations/ptaco
ma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="constraintsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:constraint|.//ptacoma:constraintsGroupDiagram|.//ptacoma
:groupWODiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="constraintsSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:constraintsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:constraints/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//ptacoma:co
nstraintsGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="constraintsFromSymbolKey">
<selector xpath=".//ptacoma:groupWODiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="constraintsFromSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:constraintsFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:constraints/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:fr
om|.//ptacoma:constraints/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:constr
aintsDiagram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:constraintsDiagram/
ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="typeDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:type|.//ptacoma:typeDefGroupDiagram|.//ptacoma:groupWODi
agram"/>
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<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typeDefSymbolKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:typeDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:typeDef/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//ptacoma:typeDe
fGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="typeDefFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:groupWODiagram|.//ptacoma:entity|.//ptacoma:entitiesAndD
omainsGroupDiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typeDefFromSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:typeDefFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:typeDef/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.
//ptacoma:typeDef/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:typeDefDiagram
/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:typeDefDiagram/ptacoma:relation
s/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="usersAndDomainsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:user|.//ptacoma:usersAndDomainsGroupDiagram|.//ptacoma:g
roupWODiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="usersAndDomainsSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:usersAndDomainsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:usersAndDomains/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//ptacom
a:usersAndDomainsGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="usersAndDomainsFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:groupWODiagram|.//ptacoma:user|.//ptacoma:domain|.//ptac
oma:domainModDefGroupDiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="usersAndDomainsFromSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:usersAndDomainsFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:usersAndDomains/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacom
a:from|.//ptacoma:usersAndDomains/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|.//ptacom
a:usersAndDomainsDiagram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:usersAn
dDomainsDiagram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="entitiesAndDomainsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:entity|.//ptacoma:entitiesAndDomainsGroupDiagram|.//ptac
oma:groupWODiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="entitiesAndDomainsSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:entitiesAndDomainsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:entitiesAndDomains/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//pta
coma:entitiesAndDomainsGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
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<key name="entetiesAndDomainsFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:groupWODiagram|.//ptacoma:entity|.//ptacoma:domain|.//pt
acoma:domainModDefGroupDiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="entetiesAndDomainsFromSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:entetiesAndDomainsFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:entitiesAndDomains/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/pta
coma:from|.//ptacoma:entitiesAndDomains/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|.//
ptacoma:entitiesAndDomainsDiagram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.//ptacom
a:entitiesAndDomainsDiagram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="domainModDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:domain|.//ptacoma:domainModDefGroupDiagram|.//ptacoma:gr
oupWODiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="domainModDefSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:domainModDefSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:domainModDef/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//ptacoma:d
omainModDefGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="domainModDefFromSymbolKey">
<selector xpath=".//ptacoma:groupWODiagram|.//ptacoma:domain"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="domainModDefFromSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:domainModDefFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:domainModDef/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:f
rom|.//ptacoma:domainModDef/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:doma
inModDefDiagram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma:domainModDefDiag
ram/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="typesEntitiesDomainsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:type|.//ptacoma:entity|.//ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomainsGr
oupDiagram|.//ptacoma:groupWODiagram"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typesEntitiesDomainsSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomainsSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomains/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|.//p
tacoma:typesEntitiesDomainsGroupDiagram/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</keyref>
<key name="typesEntitiesDomainsFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:groupWODiagram|.//ptacoma:domain|.//ptacoma:entity|.//pt
acoma:type"/>
<field xpath="@id"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typesEntitiesDomainsFromSymbolKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomainsFromSymbolKey">
<selector
xpath=".//ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomains/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/p
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tacoma:from|.//ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomains/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from
|.//ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomains/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|.//ptacoma
:typesEntitiesDomains/ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="allSymbols">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:children" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:constraint" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:domain" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:entity" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:groupWODiagram" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:node" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:policy" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:policyView" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:role" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:subtree" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:tableRow" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:type" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:user" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="children">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:eoid"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="constraint">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="domain">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:scope" minOccurs=’0’ maxOccurs=’1’/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="entity">
<complexType>
<sequence>
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<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:address"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="groupWODiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="node">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:eoid"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="policy">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:accessType"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:policyType"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:priority" minOccurs=’0’ maxOccurs=’1’/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="policyView">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="role">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:all" minOccurs=’0’ maxOccurs=’1’/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="subtree">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:eoid"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
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<element name="tableRow">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:eoid"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:index"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="type">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:all" minOccurs=’0’ maxOccurs=’1’/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="user">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:commonAttributes"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:securityName" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="mainGroupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:mainDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
<key name="mainDiagramGroupFromKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="mainDiagramGroupFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:mainDiagramGroupFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="mainDiagramGroupToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:SDPolicyDef/ptacoma:symbols/
ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:policyDef/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:roleDef/ptacoma:sy
mbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:typeDef/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:policyViewDef/
ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="mainDiagramGroupToKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:mainDiagramGroupToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
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<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="mainDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:mainDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="id" type="ID" use="required"/>
</complexType>
<key name="mainDiagramFromKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="mainDiagramFromKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:mainDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="mainDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:SDPolicyDef/ptacoma:symbols/
ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:policyDef/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:roleDef/ptacoma:sy
mbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:typeDef/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:policyViewDef/
ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="mainDiagramToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:mainDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<group name="mainDiagramContents">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:policyDef" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:SDPolicyDef" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:policyViewDef" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:roleDef" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:typeDef" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="policyDef">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:subjects" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:targets" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:constraints" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:subject" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
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<key name="policyFromKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="policyFromKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:policyFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:subject/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="policyToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:constraints/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:targets/
ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="policyToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:policyToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="policySubjectToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:subjects/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="policySubjectToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:policySubjectToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:subject/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="SDPolicyDef">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:subjects" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:constraints" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:subject" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="SDpolicyFromKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="SDpolicyFromKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:SDpolicyFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:subject/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="SDpolicyToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:subjects/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:constraints
/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="SDpolicyToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:SDpolicyToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
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</keyref>
<key name="SDpolicySubjectToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:subjects/ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="SDpolicySubjectToKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:SDpolicySubjectToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:subject/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<group name="subjectsDiagramContents">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:domainModDef" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="subjects">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:subjectsDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="subjectsFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModeDef/ptacoma:symbol
s/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="subjectsFromKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:subjectsFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="subjectsToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModeDef/ptacoma:symbol
s/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="subjectsToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:subjectsToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="subjectsGroupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:subjectsDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="subjectsDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModeDef/ptacoma:symbol
s/ptacoma:symbol"/>
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<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="subjectsDiagramFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:subjectsDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="subjectsDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModeDef/ptacoma:symbol
s/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="subjectsDiagramToKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:subjectsDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<group name="policyViewDefDiagramContents">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomains" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="policyViewDef">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:policyViewDefDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="policyViewDefGroupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:policyViewDefDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<group name="targetsDiagramContents">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:domainModDef" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="targets">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:targetsDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="targetsFromKey">
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<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModDef/ptacoma:symbols
/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="targetsFromKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:targetsFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="targetsToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModeDef/ptacoma:symbol
s/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="targetsToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:targetsToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="targetsGroupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:targetsDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="targetsDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModDef/ptacoma:symbols
/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="targetsDiagramFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:targetsDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="targetsDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModeDef/ptacoma:symbol
s/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="targetsDiagramToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:targetsDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<group name="constraintsDiagramContents">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
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</sequence>
</group>
<element name="constraints">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:constraintsDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="constraintsFromKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="constraintsFromKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:constraintsFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="constraintsToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="constraintsToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:constraintsToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="constraintsGroupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:constraintsDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="constraintsDiagramFromKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="constraintsDiagramFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:constraintsDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="constraintsDiagramToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="constraintsDiagramToKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:constraintsDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<group name="roleDefDiagramContents">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
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<element ref="ptacoma:usersAndDomains" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="roleDef">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:roleDefDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="roleDefFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:usersAndDomains/ptacoma:symb
ols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="roleDefFromKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:roleDefFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="roleDefToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="roleDefToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:roleDefToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="roleDefGroupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:roleDefDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="roleDefDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:usersAndDomains/ptacoma:symb
ols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="roleDefDiagramFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:roleDefDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="roleDefDiagramToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="roleDefDiagramToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:roleDefDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
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</keyref>
</element>
<group name="typeDefDiagramContents">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:entitiesAndDomains" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="typeDef">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:typeDefDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="typeDefFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:entitiesAndDomains/ptacoma:s
ymbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typeDefFromKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:typeDefFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="typeDefToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typeDefToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:typeDefToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="typeDefGroupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:typeDefDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="typeDefDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:entitiesAndDomains/ptacoma:s
ymbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typeDefDiagramFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:typeDefDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="typeDefDiagramToKey">
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<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typeDefDiagramToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:typeDefDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<group name="usersAndDomainsDiagramContents">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:domainModDef" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="usersAndDomains">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:usersAndDomainsDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="usersAndDomainsFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModDef/ptacoma:symbols
/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="usersAndDomainsFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:usersAndDomainsFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="usersAndDomainsToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="usersAndDomainsToKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:usersAndDomainsToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="usersAndDomainsGroupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:usersAndDomainsDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="usersAndDomainsDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModDef/ptacoma:symbols
/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="usersAndDomainsDiagramFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:usersAndDomainsDiagramFromKey">
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<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="usersAndDomainsDiagramToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="usersAndDomainsDiagramToKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:usersAndDomainsDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<group name="entitiesAndDomainDiagramContents">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:domainModDef" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="entitiesAndDomains">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:entitiesAndDomainDiagramContents"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="entitiesAndDomainsFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModDef/ptacoma:symbols
/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="entitiesAndDomainsFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:entitiesAndDomainsFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="entitiesAndDomainsToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="entitiesAndDomainsToKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:entitiesAndDomainsToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="entitiesAndDomainsGroupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:entitiesAndDomainDiagramContents"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
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<key name="entitiesAndDomainsDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModDef/ptacoma:symbols
/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="entitiesAndDomainsDiagramFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:entitiesAndDomainsDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="entitiesAndDomainsDiagramToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="entitiesAndDomainsDiagramToKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:entitiesAndDomainsDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<group name="domainModDefDiagramContents">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:logicrelations" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="domainModDef">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:domainModDefDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="domainModDefFromKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="domainModDefFromKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:domainModDefFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="domainModDefToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="domainModDefToKeyRef" refer="ptacoma:domainModDefToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="domainModDefGroupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:domainModDefDiagramContents" minOccurs="1"
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maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="domainModDefDiagramFromKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="domainModDefDiagramFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:domainModDefDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="domainModDefDiagramToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="domainModDefDiagramToKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:domainModDefDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<group name="typesEntitiesDomainsDiagramContents">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbols" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:domainModDef" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:relations" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="typesEntitiesDomains">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomainsDiagramContents"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="typesEntitiesDomainsFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModDef/ptacoma:symbols
/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typesEntitiesDomainsFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomainsFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="typesEntitiesDomainsToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typesEntitiesDomainsToKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomainsToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
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</keyref>
</element>
<element name="typesEntitiesDomainsGroupDiagram">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomainsDiagramContents"
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
<key name="typesEntitiesDomainsDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol|ptacoma:domainModDef/ptacoma:symbols
/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typesEntitiesDomainsDiagramFromKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomainsDiagramFromKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:from|ptacoma:relations/pt
acoma:exclude/ptacoma:from"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
<key name="typesEntitiesDomainsDiagramToKey">
<selector xpath="ptacoma:symbols/ptacoma:symbol"/>
<field xpath="@ref"/>
</key>
<keyref name="typesEntitiesDomainsDiagramToKeyRef"
refer="ptacoma:typesEntitiesDomainsDiagramToKey">
<selector
xpath="ptacoma:relations/ptacoma:include/ptacoma:to|ptacoma:relations/ptac
oma:exclude/ptacoma:to"/>
<field xpath="."/>
</keyref>
</element>
<element name="relations">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:relationGroup" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<group name="relationGroup">
<choice>
<element ref="ptacoma:include"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:exclude"/>
</choice>
</group>
<element name="logicrelations">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<group ref="ptacoma:relationGroup" minOccurs="0"
maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<group name="logicrelationGroup">
<choice>
<element ref="ptacoma:include"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:exclude"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:logical"/>
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</choice>
</group>
<element name="logical">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:from" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:to" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
<attribute name="type" type="string" use="required"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="include">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:from" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:to" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="subject">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:from" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:to" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="exclude">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:from" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:to" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="symbols">
<complexType>
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:symbol" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="symbol">
<complexType>
<attribute name="ref" type="IDREF"/>
</complexType>
</element>
<group name="commonAttributes">
<sequence>
<element ref="ptacoma:name" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:description" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1"/>
<element ref="ptacoma:attr" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="unbounded"/>
</sequence>
</group>
<element name="accessType" type="string"/>
<element name="id" type="ID"/>
<element name="name" type="string"/>
<element name="description" type="string"/>
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<element name="priority" type="integer"/>
<element name="address" type="string"/>
<element name="eoid" type="string"/>
<element name="index" type="string"/>
<element name="from" type="IDREF"/>
<element name="to" type="IDREF"/>
<element name="all">
<simpleType>
<restriction base="string">
<enumeration value="yes"/>
<enumeration value="no"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
</element>
<element name="policyType">
<simpleType>
<restriction base="string">
<enumeration value="min"/>
<enumeration value="max"/>
<enumeration value="exact"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
</element>
<element name="scope">
<simpleType>
<restriction base="string">
<enumeration value="all"/>
<enumeration value="siblings"/>
<enumeration value="children"/>
</restriction>
</simpleType>
</element>
<element name="attr">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="name" type="string" use="required"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
<element name="securityName">
<complexType>
<simpleContent>
<extension base="string">
<attribute name="password" type="string" use="optional"/>
<attribute name="certificate" type="string" use="optional"/>
</extension>
</simpleContent>
</complexType>
</element>
</schema>
Appendix F
MAPI MIB
MAPI-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
IMPORTS
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, NOTIFICATION-TYPE, Counter32, Counter64,
Gauge32, enterprises FROM SNMPv2-SMI
DisplayString, TimeStamp
FROM SNMPv2-TC
IANAifType FROM IANAifType-MIB;
uninett OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { enterprises 2428 }
uninettExperiment OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { uninett 2428 }
mapiMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
LAST-UPDATED "0307070000Z"
ORGANIZATION "LOBSTER Consortium"
CONTACT-INFO
"URL: http://www.ist-lobster.org
Email: info@ist-lobster.org
Editor: Arne Oslebo
UNINETT
Postal: N-7465 Trondheim
Norway
Email: Arne.Oslebo@uninett.no"
DESCRIPTION
"The MIB module to describe Monitoring API related objects."
::= { uninettExperiment 124 }
mapiMIBObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapiMIB 1 }
-- mibTraps OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapiMIB 2 }
-- mibMIBConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { mapiMIB 3 }
-- Interfaces group ********************************************************
-- The interface group provides information about interfaces that are
-- available in MAPI for monitoring
mapiIfTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF mapiIfEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Information about each avaiable interface"
::= { mapiMIBObjects 1 }
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mapiIfEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX MapiIfEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An entry in this table provides information about a
specific interface."
INDEX { mapiIfIndex }
::= { mapiIfTable 1 }
MapiIfEntry ::= SEQUENCE
{
mapiIfIndex
mapiIfName
mapiIfDescr
mapiIfAlias
mapiIfType
mapiIfStatus
mapiIfPkts
mapiIfOctets
mapiIfDroppedPkts
mapiIfLastBufferSize
mapiIfCounterDiscontinuityTime
}
mapiIfIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique value, greater than zero, for each device available
for monitoring through MAPI. It is recommended that the values are
assigned contiguously starting from one and remain constant from
one re-initialization of the system to the next re-initialization"
::={ mapiIfEntry 1 }
mapiIfName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString (SIZE (0..64))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A textual string containing the name of the interface. The name should
uniquely identify the interface in the host system. An example of a device
name is ’/dev/eth1’"
::={ mapiIfEntry 2 }
mapiIfDescr OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString (SIZE (0..255))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A textual string containing information about the interface. The
string should include the name of the manufacturer, the product
name and the version of the device hardware/software."
::={ mapiIfEntry 3 }
mapiIfAlias OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString (SIZE (0..64))
MAX-ACCESS read-write
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"This object is an ’alias’ name for the interface as
specified by a network manager, and provides a non-volatile
’handle’ for the device.
On the first instantiation of an interface, the value of
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mapiIfAlias associated with that device is the zero-length
string. As and when a value is written into an instance of
mapiIfAlias through a network management set operation, then the
agent must retain the supplied value in the mapiIfAlias instance
associated with the same interface for as long as that device remains
instantiated, including across all re-initializations/reboots of the
network management system, including those which result in a change of
the device’s mapiIfIndex value."
::= { mapiIfEntry 4 }
mapiIfType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX IANAifType
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The type of interface. Additional values for ifType are
assigned by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA),
through updating the syntax of the IANAifType textual
convention."
::= { mapiIfEntry 5 }
mapiIfStatus OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX INTEGER32 {
active(1), -- currently being used for measurements
ready(2), -- ready to be used for measurements
unavailable(3), -- unavailable for measurements
linkLost(4), -- network link is down
unknown(5) -- status of interface can not be determined
}
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The current status of the interface."
::={ mapiIfEntry 6 }
mapiIfPkts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of packets captured by the interface.
Discontinuities in the value of this counter can occur at
re-initialization of the management system, and at other times as
indicated by the value of mapiIfCounterDiscontinuityTime."
::={ mapiIfEntry 7 }
mapiIfOctets OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of octets captured by the interface.
Discontinuities in the value of this counter can occur at
re-initialization of the management system, and at other times as
indicated by the value of mapiIfCounterDiscontinuityTime."
::={ mapiIfEntry 8 }
mapiIfDroppedPkts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of dropped packets during packet capture by the
interface.
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Discontinuities in the value of this counter can occur at
re-initialization of the management system, and at other times as
indicated by the value of mapiIfCounterDiscontinuityTime."
::={ mapiIfEntry 9 }
mapiIfLastBufferSize OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of octets that was last read from the interface."
::={ mapiIfEntry 10 }
mapiIfCounterDiscontinuityTime OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeStamp
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The value of sysUpTime on the most recent occasion at which
any one or more of this interface’s counters suffered a
discontinuity."
::= { mapiIfEntry 11 }
-- mapiOrganizationTable ****************************************************
mapiOrgTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF mapiOrgEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Information about organizations that are allowed access to MAPI"
::= { mapiMIBObjects 2 }
mapiOrgEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX MapiOrgEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An entry in this table provides information about a
specific interface."
INDEX { mapiOrgID }
::= { mapiOrgTable 1 }
MapiOrgEntry ::= SEQUENCE
{
mapiOrgID
mapiOrgName
mapiOrgContact
mapiOrgContactPhone
mapiOrgContactEmail
}
mapiOrgID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique value, greater than zero, for each organization that has
access to MAPI. It is recommended that the values are
assigned contiguously starting from one and remain constant from
one re-initialization of the system to the next re-initialization"
::={ mapiOrgEntry 1 }
mapiOrgName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString (SIZE (0..64))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
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DESCRIPTION
"A textual string containing the name of the organization"
::={ mapiOrgEntry 2 }
mapiOrgContact OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString (SIZE (0..64))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A textual string containing the name of the contact person for this
organization"
::={ mapiOrgEntry 3 }
mapiOrgContactPhone OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString (SIZE (0..64))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A textual string containing the phone number for the contact person for this
organization"
::={ mapiOrgEntry 4 }
mapiOrgEmail OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString (SIZE (0..64))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A textual string containing the email address for the contact person for this
organization"
::={ mapiOrgEntry 5 }
-- mapiUserTable ****************************************************
mapiUserTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF mapiUserEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Information about organizations that are allowed access to MAPI"
::= { mapiMIBObjects 3 }
mapiUserEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX MapiUserEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An entry in this table provides information about a
specific interface."
INDEX { mapiOrgID mapiUserID }
::= { mapiUserTable 1 }
MapiUserEntry ::= SEQUENCE
{
mapiUserID
mapiUserName
mapiUserLoginName
mapiUserLastLogin
mapiUserTotalFlows
mapiUserActiveFlows
}
mapiUserID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique value, greater than zero, for each user that has
access to MAPI. It is recommended that the values are
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assigned contiguously starting from one and remain constant from
one re-initialization of the system to the next re-initialization"
::={ mapiUserEntry 1 }
mapiUserName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString (SIZE (0..64))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A textual string containing the full name of the user"
::={ mapiUserEntry 2 }
mapiUserLoginName OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString (SIZE (0..16))
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A textual string containing the login name of the user"
::={ mapiUserEntry 3 }
mapiUserLastLogin OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeStamp
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"Date and time for when the last time the user connected to MAPI"
::={ mapiUserEntry 4 }
mapiUserTotalFlows OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of flows created by the user"
::={ mapiUserEntry 5 }
mapiUserActiveFlows OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of currently active flows owned by the user"
::={ mapiUserEntry 6 }
-- mapiFlowTable ****************************************************
mapiFlowTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF mapiFlowEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Information about active or resently closed MAPI flows"
::= { mapiMIBObjects 4 }
mapiFlowEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX MapiFlowEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An entry in this table provides information about a
specific flow."
INDEX { mapiOrgID mapiUserID mapiFlowID }
::= { mapiFlowTable 1 }
MapiFlowEntry ::= SEQUENCE
{
mapiFlowID
mapiFlowIfIndex
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mapiFlowNumFunctions
mapiFlowPkts
mapiFlowOctets
mapiFlowDroppedPkts
mapiFlowStart
mapiFlowEnd
}
mapiFlowID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique value, greater than zero, for each MAPI flow."
::={ mapiFlowEntry 1 }
mapiFlowIfIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The ifIndex number identifying the interface this flow
is running on."
::={ mapiFlowEntry 2 }
mapiFlowIfIndex OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter32
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The number of functions that are applied to this flow"
::={ mapiFlowEntry 3 }
mapiFlowPkts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of packets captured by the flow."
::={ mapiFlowEntry 4 }
mapiFlowOctets OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of octets captured by the flow."
::={ mapiFlowEntry 5 }
mapiFlowDroppedPkts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of dropped packets during packet capture by the
flow."
::={ mapiFlowEntry 6 }
mapiFlowStart OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeStamp
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The value of sysUpTime at the start of the flow"
::={ mapiFlowEntry 7 }
176 APPENDIX F. MAPI MIB
mapiFlowEnd OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX TimeStamp
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The value of sysUpTime at the end of the flow. If the flow is
still active the value should be 0"
::={ mapiFlowEntry 8 }
-- mapiFunctionTable ****************************************************
mapiFunctionTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF mapiFunctionEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Information about functions applied to MAPI flows"
::= { mapiMIBObjects 5 }
mapiFunctionEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX MapiFunctionEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An entry in this table provides information about a
specific function."
INDEX { mapiOrgID mapiUserID mapiFlowID mapiFunctionID}
::= { mapiFunctionTable 1 }
MapiFunctionEntry ::= SEQUENCE
{
mapiFunctionID
mapiFunctionPkts
mapiFunctionOctets
mapiFunctionPassedPkts
mapiFunctionDroppedPkts
}
mapiFunctionID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique value, greater than zero, for each function."
::={ mapiFunctionEntry 1 }
mapiFunctionPkts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of packets captured by the function."
::={ mapiFunctionEntry 2 }
mapiFunctionOctets OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of octets captured by the function."
::={ mapiFunctionEntry 3 }
mapiFunctionPassedPkts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
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"The total number of packets that has passed through the function."
::={ mapiFunctionEntry 4 }
mapiFlowDroppedPkts OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Counter64
MAX-ACCESS read-only
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"The total number of dropped packets during packet capture by the
function."
::={ mapiFlowEntry 5 }
-- mapiArgumentTable ****************************************************
mapiArgumentTable OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF mapiArgumentEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "Information about arguments to MAPI functions"
::= { mapiMIBObjects 6 }
mapiArgumentEntry OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX MapiArgumentEntry
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION "An entry in this table provides information about a
specific argument."
INDEX { mapiOrgID mapiUserID mapiFlowID mapiFunctionID mapiArgumentID }
::= { mapiArgumentTable 1 }
MapiArgumentEntry ::= SEQUENCE
{
mapiArgumentID
mapiArgumentType
mapiArgumentValue
}
mapiArgumentID OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX Integer32
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A unique value, greater than zero, for each argument."
::={ mapiArgumentEntry 1 }
mapiArgumentType OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString (SIZE (0..64))
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"A string showing the type of argument, eg. integer, float, string etc."
::={ mapiArgumentEntry 1 }
mapiArgumentValue OBJECT-TYPE
SYNTAX DisplayString (SIZE (0..256))
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
STATUS current
DESCRIPTION
"String representation of the value of the argument"
::={ mapiArgumentEntry 1 }
END
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